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INTRODUCTION

Functioning in independent, sequential roles, much like sorting
arms in a complex assembly line, federal courts and the Federal Bureau of Prisons have traditionally relied upon shared assumptions
when sentencing convicted defendants and placing them in appropriate facilities. The power to decide the length and nature of a defendant's sentence rests exclusively in the hands of federal judges, 3 who
must apply sentencing formulas prescribed by the United States Sen(2000)); Robert A. Anthony, "Interpretive" Rules, "Legislative" Rules and "Spurious" Rules:
Lifting the Smog, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1, 4 n.13 (1994) ("'Smog' has become a catchword for
the perplexities that beset the distinctions among nonlegislative rules.").
3
Cf United States v. Curry, 767 F.2d 328, 331 (7th Cir. 1985) ("The determination
of a sentence imposes a responsibility of staggering proportions on the court. In the eyes
of most citizens, this function is probably the single most important duty performed by
judges.... The . . . view that such a function should be performed only by one who has
had the opportunity to judge for himself the credibility of those on whose word the decision is based is in line with one of the most deeply rooted principles in our law."); Banks v.
United States, 614 F.2d 95, 99 (6th Cir. 1980) ("Sentencing is probably the most difficult
task faced by a federal district judge."); lacaboni v. United States, 251 F. Supp. 2d 1015,
1022 (D. Mass. 2003) ("No judicial responsibility is more serious than sentencing.").

INTERPRETIVE RULES

2005]

tencing Commission (the Commission) 4 and who may, in their limited discretion, evaluate additional factors. 5 Similarly, the power to
place an individual in a penal or correctional facility rests exclusively
with the Federal Bureau of Prisons (the Bureau),6 a federal agency
under the authority of the Department of Justice (DOJ).7 Despite the
strict statutory demarcation of their responsibilities, federal courts
and the Bureau have nonetheless developed common understandings
to facilitate the seamless transfer and review of prisoners. 8
For over forty years, 9 the Bureau heeded judges' recommendations that it place select nonviolent offenders with short sentences in
Community Confinement Centers (CCCs),1 ° more commonly known
as halfway houses.1 ' This long-standing practice permitted judges to
consider alternative forms of incarceration for cases "on the border4 The Commission is an independent federal agency whose "purpose is to establish
sentencing policies and practices for the federal criminal justice system that will assure the
ends of justice by promulgating detailed guidelines prescribing the appropriate sentences
for offenders convicted of federal crimes." See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1,

pt. A, at 1 (2001).
5 See id. Under the modern sentencing system, federal judges select a criminal sentence in accordance with detailed guidelines issued by the Commission. See id. Congress
and the Commission promulgated the Guidelines to eliminate arbitrary discrepancies in
sentencing. See 28 U.S.C. § 991 (b)(1)(B) (2000). The Supreme Court's recent decision in
United States v. Booker, _

U.S. __ , 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), finding that certain mandatory

provisions of the Federal Sentencing Act are incompatible with defendants' Sixth Amendment rights and must be severed from the Act, does not alter the conclusions of this Note.
See also discussion infra Part I.C.1, III.B.1-2 (supporting this Note's premise that the Guidelines bind only federal judges and that the Department ofJustice improperly stretched the
Guidelines to restrict the discretion of the Federal Bureau of Prisons).
6 Congress created the Federal Bureau of Prisons in 1930 to "professionalize the
prison service, and to ensure consistent and centralized administration of the 11 Federal
prisons in operation at that time." FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ABOUT
THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS 2 (2001), available at http://www.bop.gov/news/PDFs/
lpaabout.pdf [hereinafter ABOUT THE BUREAU].

28 C.F.R. §§ 0.1, 0.95-99 (2004); see discussion infra Part IV.B.
See An Interview with Bureau of PrisonsDirectorKathleen M. Hawk, THE THIRD BRANCH,
June 1996, http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/jun96ttb/hawk.htm ("We take very seriously judicial recommendations that an inmate be placed in a particular institution or particular
type of institution.... The [B]ureau's mission is to carry out the sentences of the courts
7
8

... .

.).

9 See, e.g., Monahan v. Winn, 276 F. Supp. 2d 196, 205 (D. Mass. 2003).
10 A CCC is a "community treatment center, halfway house, restitution center, mental
health facility, alcohol or drug rehabilitation center, or other community facility" where
residents participate in "gainful employment, employment search efforts, community service, vocational training, treatment, educational programs, or similar facility-approved programs during non-residential hours." See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5F1l.1,

cmt. n.1 (2001). But cf Howard v. Ashcroft, 248 F. Supp. 2d 518, 522 n.13 (M.D. La. 2003)
(suggesting that the term "halfway house" may be misleading, because not all inmates are
"halfway between jail and home," but rather are punished for an extended period of time,
with limited privileges for employment and some contact with the community).
1
The Bureau nonetheless retained its discretion to disregard such judicial recommendations. See lacaboni v. United States, 251 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1023 (D. Mass. 2003).
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line between probation and incarceration."1 2 At the same time, this
alternative permitted the Bureau to place nonviolent prisoners in a
facility that was cost effective to taxpayers and the defendants' communities. 13 Congress and the Commission consistently encouraged
the use of this alternative, and the Supreme Court noted it with approval. 14 Bureau guidance manuals, published by the DOJ, also docu15
mented and reinforced this practice.
In December 2002, however, the DOJ caused a "sea change in
settled understandings" 16 by announcing that placing individuals directly in CCCs was "unlawful. ' 17 In the form of a memorandum (the
Memorandum), the DOJ instructed the Bureau to disregard any prospective recommendations for CCC placement, 18 as well as to apply
the new "policy" 19 retroactively. 20 This abrupt change prompted individuals to challenge the Memorandum's "policy" and file for injunctions to prevent their immediate transfer from CCCs to more
conventional prisons. 21 Such petitions raised the ire ofjudges nationwide, 22 who expressed shock at the "amputation of the [Bureau's] dis12
13

Monahan, 276 F. Supp. 2d at 199.
Prisoners in a CCC were required to contribute twenty-five percent of their gross

income to help defray the costs of the CCC. See Program Statement No. 7310.04, Fed.
Bureau of Prisons, U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Community Corrections Center (CCC) Utilization
and Transfer Procedure 4 (Dec. 16, 1998), http://www.bop.gov//policy/progstat/7310004.pdf [hereinafter Program Statement No. 7310.04]. Additionally, the cost of confining
an individual in a CCC is "far less than the price tag on more conventional forms of imprisonment." Iacaboni,251 F. Supp. 2d at 1023. CCCs were also a desirable choice because an
inmate could "continue employment outside the facility during the day, and can maintain
ties with vulnerable family members, such as children or ailing parents"; the inmate's employment often permitted families to stay out of the welfare and the foster care systems. Id,
at 1022.
14 See Byrd v. Moore, 252 F. Supp. 2d 293, 299 (W.D.N.C. 2003).
15
See infra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
16 Mallory v. United States, No. Civ.A. 03-10220-DPW, 2003 WL 1563764, at *1 (D.
Mass. Mar. 25, 2003).
17
See Memorandum Opinion from M. Edward Whelan III, Principal Deputy Assistant
Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to the Deputy Attorney
General (Dec. 13, 2002), http://fd.org/Publications/SpecTop/bopimp.PDF (online version at 1) [hereinafter Memorandum (paginated as online version)].
18 See id. at 8.
19 The label "policy," as distinguished from "rule," signals important implications in
the context of administrative law. This Note will refer to the DOJ Memorandum as a "policy" until Part IV, when it will address reasons for classifying it as either a policy or a rule.
Throughout their analyses, several district courts referred to the Memorandum as a "policy" to indicate that they reserved judgment as to the proper classification of the action
prior to a full analysis of the label and its ramifications. See, e.g., Howard v. Ashcroft, 248 F.
Supp. 2d 518, 525-26 (M.D. La. 2003). This Note adopts the use of this term in quotations
to indicate the same.
20 See infra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
21
See infra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
22
See, e.g., Jacaboni v. United States, F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1018 (D. Mass. 2003);
Monahan v. Winn, 276 F. Supp. 2d 196, 199-200 (D. Mass. 2003).
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cretion" 23 and the insult to the courts, and who criticized that even if
the Bureau's "about-face on community corrections could somehow
be justified . . . it should never have been carried out in the cavalier
24
manner it was."
The Memorandum marked a radical shift from the preexisting
policy, which had been "repeatedly and explicitly conveyed to the judiciary" since 1965 and under which the Bureau considered judicial
recommendations regarding sentencing when it was appropriate to do
so. 2 5 The DOJ, however, firmly defended the Memorandum on the
grounds that it corrected a long-standing erroneous application of 18
U.S.C. § 3621, the statute outlining the Bureau's responsibilities with
respect to convicted individuals. 26 The DOJ argued that community
confinement does not constitute imprisonment for the purposes of a
sentencing order, 27 and that the Bureau consequently lacks the authority to place in community confinement an offender who has been
sentenced to a term of imprisonment.2 8 The DOJ thus declared that
the Bureau could no longer designate offenders to CCCs or heed judicial recommendations for such placement. 29 The DOJ directed the
Bureau to apply this new placement regime both prospectively and
retroactively, forcing inmates who had more than 150 days remaining
30
in their sentences to transfer from CCCs to conventional prisons.
While many commentators presume that the impetus for the Memorandum was a general crackdown on white-collar criminals,3 1 the DOJ
has not publicly asserted a reason for revisiting the Bureau's discretion under § 3261.32
The Memorandum caught the courts, prisoners, and even some
at the Bureau by surprise. Prisoners' petitions in the face of impending transfer to distant, minimum-security facilities demonstrated the
personal costs of the DOJ's policy shift. The petitioners' stories highlighted the effectiveness of confinement in CCCs, describing how
CCCs rehabilitated nonviolent offenders and permitted them to provide for their children and families, while nonetheless isolating them
23

24
25
26
27
28
29

lacaboni, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 1018.
Id.
Id. at 1017.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3621 (2000); Memorandum, supra note 18, at 1-9.
Memorandum, supra note 17, at 1-4.

Id. at 5-9.
Id. at 4, 8-9.
30
See Iacaboni, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 1017.
31
See id. at 1023; Dan Eggen, White-CollarCrime Now Gets Real Time: New Federal Prison
Policy Criticized, WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 2003, at A6.
32
But cf Monahan v. Winn, 276 F. Supp. 2d 196, 205 n.9 (D. Mass. 2003) ("There is a
certain disingenuousness about the 'occasion' for this revisitation of policy. The [DOJ]
Opinion is written as if in response to a [Bureau] consultation about an unanswered question regarding its authority ... when in fact the issue was well-settled in a [Bureau] Program Statement and manual.").
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from society as punishment for their offenses. 33 On an institutional
level, the abruptness of the DOJ's "policy" change and its retroactive
application clearly struck a nerve on the bench. Courts expressed outrage that, months after judges had sentenced certain defendants, a
"bureaucrat in an office in Washington D.C. determined that the entire legal world had been acting under the same shared 'unlawful'
fantasy for decades and acted to bring us all back into step with his
34
vision of the law."

Petitioners sought relief from the retroactive application of the
DOJ "policy" by filing preliminary injunctions in federal district courts
throughout the country. While some courts rejected petitioners'
claims on the grounds that petitioners had not exhausted their administrative remedies, 35 other courts agreed to hear petitioners' claims
on the grounds that any further administrative appeal was futile in
light of the DOJ's unyielding "policy." 3 6 Scrutinizing the Memorandum, this second group of courts concluded that the DOJ's "policy"
substantively lacked merit and that Congress did not intend to reduce
the Bureau's discretion to designate prisoners to facilities under the
Bureau's control. 37 These courts ruled that the Memorandum was a
substantive rule and was therefore procedurally invalid for its failure
to comply with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).38 Further,
these courts argued that the retroactive application of the DOJ's "policy" violated constitutional due-process protections afforded to persons standing before a court for sentencing.3 9
33
See, e.g., Howard v. Ashcroft, 248 F. Supp. 2d 518, 535 (M.D. La. 2003); lacaboni,251
F. Supp. 2d at 1022-23.
34
See Howard, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 531.
-5
See, e.g., United States v. James, 244 F. Supp. 2d 817, 820 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (asserting that the court did not have jurisdiction to grant the prisoner a temporary restraining
order to prevent the Bureau from transferring him from a CCC to a conventional prison,
because Congress intended prison designation to be a matter of Bureau discretion). Several courts also expressed doubt that any judge's decision to recommend CCC placement
could have been material where the recommendation itself was not binding upon the Bureau. See, e.g., United States v. Kramer, No. 02 CR 47, 2003 ArL 1964489, at *3 (N.D. Ill.
Apr. 28, 2003); Borgetti v. Bureau of Prisons, No. 03 C 50034, 2003 WL 743936, at *2 (N.D.
Ill. Feb. 14, 2003); United States v. Herron, Nos. 03-3039-JAR, 02-40056-001-JAR, 2003 WL
272170, at *1-2 (D. Kan. Feb. 3, 2003); James, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 819; United States v.
Schild, Nos. 00-40021-01, 03-3028-RDR, 2003 WL 260672, at *2 (D. Kan. Jan 21, 2003);
United States v. Andrews, 244 F. Supp. 2d 636, 639 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
36
See, e.g., Monahan, 276 F. Supp. 2d at 204-05; Howard, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 532-34;
Ferguson v. Ashcroft, 248 F. Supp. 2d 547, 563 (M.D. La. 2003).
37
See, e.g., Monahan, 276 F. Supp. 2d at 199-200; Iacaboni, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 1017-18
(commenting that the "well-established practice of the [Bureau] . . . was not, and is not,
even remotely 'unlawful'").
38
See, e.g., Monahan, 276 F. Supp. 2d at 215; Iacaboni, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 1038-40;
discussion infra Part III.A-B.
39
This Note will not address the propriety of retroactively applying the DOJ's new
.policy" to prisoners' detriment once the sentencing phase was already completed. For
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This Note endeavors to understand what powers Congress intended to delegate to the federal courts and the Bureau concerning
CCCs. Part I will discuss the history of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (the Guidelines) and the limitations they impose upon judicial
discretion, the history of the Bureau and the relative breadth of its
statutory authority, and the specific treatment of CCCs in the Guidelines and Bureau documents prior to December 2002. Part II will
probe the DOJ's December 2002 Memorandum, contrasting the
DOJ's interpretations with preexisting understandings between federal judges and the Bureau regarding CCC placement. Part III will
discuss the distinction between substantive and interpretive rules, and
will argue that the DOJ's "policy" poses as a substantive rule in disguise and as such is procedurally invalid for failure to comply with the
APA notice and comment procedures. Under the guidance of United
States v. Mead Coip.40 and Skidmore v. Swifit & Co., 4 1 Part IV presents

analysis in the alternative and assesses the reasonableness of the DOJ's
Memorandum as an interpretive rule. This Note will acknowledge
that the DOJ ultimately wields the authority to reverse the long-standing practice of placing inmates in CCCs, regardless of what the impetus for the revision might have been. It will conclude, however, that
the DOJ improperly employed a statutory argument to avoid procedural due-process requirements and to unhinge sentences that judges
42
had carefully evaluated.
I
LAYING THE HISTORICAL GROUNDWORK:

THE SENTENCING

GUIDELINES, THE BUREAu OF PRISONS, AND
COMMUNITY CONFINEMENT CENTERS

A.

Balancing Uniformity and Judicial Discretion: The Purpose
and Scope of Sentencing Guidelines

Seeking to curb nationwide dissatisfaction with the disparity and
uncertainty resulting from discretionary sentencing, Congress enacted
the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA). The SRA's purpose was to
replace a system in which 'judges received wide ranges within which
to sentence, but no anchoring point from which to begin," 43 with a
discussion of the due-process implications of retroactive application, see the cases cited in
supra notes 35-36.
40
533 U.S. 218 (2001).
41

42

323 U.S. 134 (1944).

See discussion infra Part IV.
Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: UnacceptableLimits on the
Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1687 (1992); see Leslie A. Cory, Looking at the
Federal Sentencing Process One Judge at a Time, One Probation Officer at a Time, 51 EMORY L.J.
379, 387-88 (2002) (commenting that prior to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, "Congress had provided courts with very little statutory guidance ....
Title 18 U.S.C. §§ 3561
43
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"comprehensive and consistent statement of the Federal law of sentencing, setting forth the purposes to be served." 4 4 The product of

this effort, the Guidelines, thus introduced a sentencing structure limiting judicial discretion. 45 Congress conceived of the Guidelines to
assure consistency in sentencing so that the purpose and rationale behind each sentence would be clear to all parties involved.4 6 The resulting system of guidelines now applies to more than ninety percent
47
of all felonies and Class A misdemeanor cases in federal courts.
The SRA created the Commission as the centerpiece of its efforts
to reduce sentencing disparities among defendants with similar
records and comparable convictions. 48 Congress directed the Commission, an independent agency within the judicial branch, to develop
sentencing guidelines utilizing categories of offenses and offenders to
prescribe suggested sentencing ranges. 49 Congress did not grant the
Commission power to enforce the Guidelines. 50 Rather, it intended
for the Commission, a "nonpolitical group of sentencing experts,"5 1 to

and 3562, both repealed when the sentencing guidelines took effect in 1987, provided only
that judgment and sentence would be imposed pursuant to Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Rule 32, in turn, provided minimal guidance.").
44
S. REP. No. 98-225, at 39 (1983), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3222.
45 See Freed, supranote 43, at 1683 (suggesting that a system of guidelines "must leave
ample room for departures from the guidelines range so that judges can accommodate
cases of greater and lesser seriousness. It must be developed by an institution that understands the complexity of criminal sentencing, that appreciates the wisdom, integrity and
sense ofjustice that animates experienced judges, and that earns the respect ofjudges and
practitioners.").
46
See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 59 (1983), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3242.
47 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, at 11 (2001). A summary
report surveying judges' views of the efficacy of the Guidelines in meeting their purported
goals, collected on the fifteenth anniversary of the Guidelines, found that judges believed
that the Guidelines had been "relatively effective" in achieving the SRA goals of "providing
punishment levels that reflect the seriousness of the offense," "providing adequate deterrence to criminal conduct," "protecting the public from further crimes of the defendant,"
and "avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records."
U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SURVEY OF ARTICLE III JUDGES: A COMPONENT OF THE FIFTEEN
YEAR REPORT ON THE U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION'S LEGISLATIVE MANDATE 2 (2002). The
report indicated that a plurality ofjudges responding to the survey opined that the Guidelines were least effective in "providing defendants with training, medical care, or treatment
in the most effective manner.., and maintaining sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences when warranted by mitigating or aggravating factors." Id.
48
See 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1) (2000).
49
See 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(1) (2000); William P. Ferranti, Note, Revised Sentencing
Guidelinesand the Ex Post Facto Clause, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 1011, 1013 (2003) (noting that the
Commission must consist of "seven voting members, at least three of whom are federal
judges").
50 See Freed, supranote 43, at 1690. The Guidelines became effective after complying
with applicable requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act and after a six-month
period of congressional oversight and review. Id. at 1695.
51
Id. at 1690.
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draft the Guidelines, and expected federal courts to independently
52
enforce them.
Although the SRA anticipated that the Guidelines would incorporate prior judicial practice, the very existence of the Guidelines displaced traditional judicial discretion in sentencing, requiring federal
judges to implement the Guidelines and holding judges accountable
for each sentencing choice. 53 By explicitly separating the functions of
creating and enforcing the Guidelines, and by focusing all of the
Guidelines' directives upon the federal courts, 54 Congress made one
thing clear: The binding authority of the Guidelines was intended to
restrain only federal courts. Indeed, the "Guidelines are administra' 55
tive handcuffs that are applied to judges and no one else."
The Guidelines specifically acknowledge judges' singular authority to determine the length and nature of defendants' sentences, and
endeavor to cabin a judge's discretion without depriving him of the
power to exercise discretion in limited situations in which he deems it
appropriate. 56 Attempting to balance uniformity with the need for
discretion in individual cases, the Guidelines arm judges with a range
of sentences and enumerate limited grounds for departure from these
prescribed ranges. 57 Despite providing grounds for departure from
the Guidelines, however, the Commission intended the number of
such departures to gradually decrease. Viewing the Commission as a
permanent body whose objective was to create a more accurate grid
over time, the SRA expected the Guidelines to adapt to previously un52

See 28 U.S.C. § 994(a) (outlining the duties of the Commission and charging it to

"promulgate and distribute ... guidelines... for use of a sentencing court in determining the
sentence to be imposed in a criminal case" (emphasis added)).
53 See Freed, supra note 43, at 1697 (noting that a federal judge must explain each
sentence, "including a 'specific reason' for some sentences, and [that] his decision is subject to appellate scrutiny").
54
See generally U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A (2001) (discussing the
SRA, outlining the Commission's efforts and reasoning in promulgating the Guidelines,
and describing how the Guidelines would be applied by the federal courts).
55
Freed, supra note 43, at 1697 (noting that the Guidelines do not bind, for example,
a U.S. Attorney negotiating a particular disposition, such as a plea bargain).
56
See Iacaboni v. United States 251 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1034 (D. Mass. 2003).
57
See 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (2000) (indicating that a court may consider, without limitation, "information concerning the background, character, and conduct" of the defen-

dant); U.S.

SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

§§ 5K2.0-.2 (2001) (enumerating appropriate

grounds for departure, including coercion, distress, and diminished capacity); Ferranti,
supra note 49, at 1013-14 (explaining that a judge may only review the guidelines, policy
statements, and official commentary issued by the Commission in deciding whether to depart from the prescribed sentencing range, and that a decision to depart is subject to
review for abuse of discretion). The limited reach of the Guidelines has been reenforced
by the Supreme Court's recent decision in United States v. Booker, U.S. - (2005), 125
S. Ct. 738, which found that certain mandatory provisions within the Guidelines must be
severed because they are incompatible with defendants' Sixth Amendment rights, id. at
759.
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foreseen circumstances with uniform solutions, thereby limiting the
volume of departures over time, both in principle and in practice. 5 8
B.

The Federal Bureau of Prisons: Placing Individuals in the
Post-Sentencing Phase

The Bureau, a federal agency under the direction of the Attorney
General, was formed in 1930 in an effort to develop and manage an
integrated system of prisons. 59 Replacing a system in which Congress
separately financed the eleven existing federal prisons, 60 Congress
granted the Bureau control and regulation of all federal penal and
correctional institutions. 61 Congress entrusted the Bureau with the
role of "protect[ing] society by confining offenders in the controlled
environments of prison and community based facilities that are safe,

humane, cost-efficient, and appropriately secure," as well as maintaining work and other self-improvement opportunities for those in the
Bureau's custody. 62 Today, the Bureau directs over 100 federal pris63
ons as well as over thirty community corrections offices.
Rather than encouraging sentencing courts and the Bureau to
operate in tandem, Congress specifically designed independent, albeit
sequential, responsibilities and spheres of influence for the courts and
the Bureau. As such, "[a] Person who has been sentenced to a term of
imprisonment... shall be committed to the custody of the Bureau of
Prisons until the expiration of the term imposed, or until earlier release for satisfactory behavior." 64 Thus, after a court has sentenced an
individual to prison, that individual becomes the Bureau's responsibility and remains in the Bureau's custody through the term of imprisonment. The Bureau has the initial responsibility of "designat[ing as]
the place of the prisoner's imprisonment . . .any available penal or

correctional facility that meets minimum standards of health and habitability established by the Bureau," upon considering a number of
factors in its discretion, including the resources of particular facilities,
the criminal history of the individual, and the nature and circumstances of her offense. 6 5 The Bureau may also consider any statement
by the sentencing judge, either concerning the purpose of the individual's imprisonment or concerning a recommendation for a specific
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch.1, pt. A, at 6 (2001).
See 18 U.S.C. § 4042(a) (2000); supra note 6.
See FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LEGAL RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS 1 (2004), availableat http://www.bop.gov//news/PDFs/legal
_guide.pdf [hereinafter LEGAL RESOURCE GUIDE].
61
See 18 U.S.C. § 4042(a).
62
See LEGAL RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 60, at 1.
63
Id.
64
18 U.S.C. § 3621(a) (2000) (emphasis added).
65
18 U.S.C. § 3621(b).
58
59
60
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type of penal or correctional facility, as well as any pertinent policy
statement issued by the Commission 'pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 994(a) (2).66
The Bureau retains broad discretion and may designate a prisoner to any penal or correctional facility, so long as it meets "minimum standards of health and habitability." 67 Official documents
issued by the DOJ endorse this broad view of the Bureau's discretion,
claiming that the statutory authority granted in the phrase "any available penal or correctional facility"68 trumps other perceived statutory
69
limitations on the Bureau.

C.

Community Confinement Centers as Conceived by the
Guidelines and the Bureau
1. Section 5C1. 1 of the Sentencing Guidelines and Its Directives
Concerning CCCs

CCCs provide two distinct programs: a prerelease component and
a community corrections component.7 0 The Guidelines devote themselves to calculating the nature and length of a term of imprisonment,
rather than the location of an individual's imprisonment. By corollary, the Guidelines do not address the direct placement of convicted
individuals in the community corrections component of CCCs, and
the language of the Guidelines does not address the focus of the Bureau's "policy" change in December 2002. The Guidelines limit discussion of CCCs to proper consideration of the prerelease
component, a placement that facilitates a prisoner's transition to a
community, 7' specifically counseling in section 5C1.1 that a sentence
of imprisonment may include "a term of supervised release with a con7
dition that substitutes community confinement or home detenion. 2
The Guidelines thus permit judges to alter the quality of an individual's sentence without departing from the prescribed sentencing
ranges for the individual's offense.
The Guidelines specifically provide that one day of community
confinement, denoted as "residence in a community treatment
66

See id.

See id.; Byrd v. Moore, 252 F. Supp. 2d 293, 301 (W.D.N.C. 2003) (emphasis added)
(suggesting that § 3621 (b) is constructed so broadly that it "rules out almost no imaginable
facility or institution, public or privately owned"); infra Part I.C.2.
68 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b).
69
See Program Statement No. 7310.04, supra note 13, at 4 (indicating that perceived
limitations set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c) do not restrict the scope of authority granted by
§ 3621 (b)).
See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N & FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, REPORT TO CONGRESS
70
67

ON THE MAXIMUM UTILIZATION OF PRISONS RESOURCES 9-10 (1994) [hereinafter REPORT TO
CONGRESS].

71
72

See Program Statement No. 7310.04, supra note 13, at 5.
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5C1.1 (c) (2) (2001).
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center, halfway house, or similar residential facility," may be substituted for one day of imprisonment. 73 Application notes to section
5C1.1 suggest that a judge "may impose a sentence of imprisonment
that includes a term of supervised release with a condition that requires community confinement or home detention. ' 74 These notes
acknowledge that the prerelease component is a part of imprisonment, rather than a term separate from imprisonment, stating that a
sentence may include a term of supervised release. 75 The Guidelines
do not, however, recommend use of this discretionary tool for individuals qualifying for a criminal history category of III or higher. 76 The
Guidelines also specifically prescribe that defendants in Zone D on
the sentencing table must fulfill the minimum term of imprisonment
without use of any imprisonment substitutes. 77 Limiting discussion of
CCCs to the prerelease component, the Guidelines thus supply courts
with an important, albeit limited, discretionary tool that allows them
to operate within the Guidelines' prescribed sentencing range and to
simultaneously facilitate inmates' transitions from the prison system to
society.
Since 1965,78 federal judges have taken their cues from statutory
language directing the Bureau to consider "any statement by the court
that imposed the sentence ... recommending a type of penal or correctional facility as appropriate,' 79 and have recommended direct

placement in CCCs for certain individuals. judges have relied upon
the availability of this option, particularly when evaluating sentences
for individuals whose cases seem to lie on the difficult line between
probation and incarceration or whose cases present particular hardships and concerns to the court.80 Nonetheless, the Bureau fundamentally retained the discretion to disregard judicial

73 See id. § 5C1.1(e) (2).
74 See id. § 5C1.1 cmt. n.3(C).
75 See id. § 5C1.1 cmt. n.4(B) ("[A]t least one-half of the minimum term specified in
the guideline range must be satisfied by imprisonment, and the remainder of the minimum term specified in the guideline range must be satisfied by community confinement
or home detention.").
76 See id. § 5C1.1 cmt. n.7.
77 The Guidelines follow a categorical table which classifies defendents by the severity
of their crime and their previous criminal history. On this scale, Zone D defendants have
the highest classification for both categories. See id. § 5Cl.I(f).
78 See Iacaboni v. United States, 251 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1017 (D. Mass. 2003).
79 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) (4) (2000).
80
See lacaboni, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 1021 (noting that without the possibility of direct
CCC placement, the judge would have considered sentencing the defendant to four years
probation with the first year to be served in the CCC, thus assuring that the defendant
would remain close to home).
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recommendations and to designate placement without judicial
interference.8 1
2.

The Bureau's Long-Standing Encouragement of CCC Placement

Acknowledging that "[n]ot all Federal inmates are confined in
prisons with fences," the Bureau has consistently encouraged alternative modes of incarceration, recognizing that such placement may be
more appropriate in certain circumstances and may simultaneously
relieve the strain on the system of penal and correctional institutions
as a whole.8 2 As late as January 2003, Kathleen Hawk Sawyer, thendirector of the Bureau, confirmed the Bureau's preexisting "deeply
rooted practice of honoring, when appropriate, judicial recommendations that low-risk, non-violent offenders serving short prison
sentences be directly designated to [CCCs]

."

Ms. Hawk Sawyer's em-

phasis on the words "when appropriate" underscores the fact that the
Bureau retained the discretion to disregard judicial recommendations
concerning designation to a CCC or comparable facility. Further, her
comments confirm the existence of a long-standing accord between
the Bureau and the federal courts prior to December 2002.
The Bureau repeatedly publicized its policy concerning direct
placement in CCCs in statements to Congress, manuals to federal
courts, and publications for general distribution. Specifically describing CCCs as "correctional facilities, '8 4 the Bureau represented to Congress in 1994 that "[t]he community corrections component [was]
designed to be sufficiently punitive to be a legitimate sanction."8 5 Bureau Program Statement No. 7310.04 confirmed this definition in
practice, noting that "' [t] he Bureau may designate any available penal
or correctional facility ... the Bureau determines to be appropriate
6
and suitable' 8,s
and that "[a] CCC meets the definition of a 'penal or

correctional facility.' ,8 7 This document conclusively defined CCCs as
"'halfway houses,' provid[ing] suitable residence, structured programs, job placement, and counseling," but otherwise confining and
closely monitoring inmates.8 8 Further, the program statement classified the community corrections component as "the most restrictive
81 See 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) (4) (stating that the Bureau may consider judicial recommendations and implying that the Bureau is not bound by them).
82 See ABOUT THE BUREAU, supra note 6, at 10.
83 See Iacaboni, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 1022 (quoting Ms. Hawk Sawyer's response to a
letter from Judge Ponsor, which had "question[ed] the manner and substance of the [Bureau's] abrupt turnabout").
84
REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 70, at 10.
85
Id. at 9-10.
86
Program Statement No. 7310.04, supra note 13, at 4 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b)
(1994)).
87
Id.
88
Id.
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option," in which inmates are released from confinement in the CCC
only for employment and limited, structured activities pending approval of the CCC.89 As compensation for this flexibility, inmates paid
twenty-five percent of their earnings as subsistence to the CCC, paying
in part for their room and board. 90
Characterizing the community corrections component of CCCs
as more restrictive than the prerelease component, Bureau documents clearly distinguished the components as separate programs requiring separate regulation. Regarding the prerelease component of
CCCs, the Bureau has traditionally followed clear statutory authority
instructing it to place prisoners in CCCs for the last ten percent of
imprisonment, a period not to exceed six months, affording prisoners
an opportunity to prepare for their transition out of an institutionalized setting. 91 Multiple Bureau manuals detail how and when a prisoner may be referred to a CCC for the prerelease component and
how the Bureau may decide which CCC may best facilitate a prisoner's
transition, as well as offering the Bureau detailed guidance regarding
92
all aspects of prerelease placement.
In the JudicialResource Guide to the FederalBureau of Prisons (judicial
Resource Guide), the DOJ offered federal judges clear guidance concerning direct placement in CCCs' community corrections component. Under the heading, "Imprisonment," the document permits
the Bureau to place an offender directly in a community-based facility,
noting that this usually transpires with the concurrence of the sentencing court. 93 Targeting federal courts as its audience, this Bureau
document specifically encourages judges to consider alternative incarceration for individuals that satisfy these general criteria and reinforces the preexisting understanding between the Bureau and federal
courts.

94

The existence of separate statutory instructions for the prerelease
component, as well as separate DOJ and Bureau guidance manuals for
this component, support two inferences: first, that any policy directive
89
90

Id. at 4-5.
Id. This section further states that failure of the inmate to make mandatory subsis-

tence payments of twenty-five percent of her earnings to the CCC may result in disciplinary

action or placement in a different facility. Id. at 4.
91
See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c) (2000).
92 See, e.g., Program Statement No. 7300.09, Fed. Bureau of Prisons & U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Community Corrections Manual, ch. 5, at 5-9 (May 19, 1999), http://www.bop.
gov//policy/progstat/7300 009.pdf.
93

U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JUDICIAL RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF PetIS-

ONS 16 (2000) [hereinafterJuDIclAL RESOURCE GUIDE]. The JudicialResource Guide suggests
that a typical offender in the community corrections component of a CCC carries a sentence of six months or less and does not have a history of violent behavior, firearms offenses, or sex crimes. Id.

94

See id. at 15-17.
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regarding a CCC must clearly designate the component it seeks to
regulate, and second, that it would be inappropriate to apply restrictions concerning the prerelease component more broadly to the com95
munity corrections component of CCCs or to CCCs generally.
II
THE DECEMBER 2002 MEMORANDUM: REINING IN ERRANT
BuREAU POWER OR

LAWMAKING IN DISGUISE?

Writing on behalf of the Office of Legal Counsel to the DOJ,
Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General M. Edward Whelan III
asserted in a memorandum to the Deputy Attorney General in December 2002 that the Bureau "does not have general authority, either
upon the recommendation of the sentencing judge or otherwise, to
place... an offender in community confinement at the outset of his
sentence or to transfer him from prison to community confinement at
96
any time [the Bureau] chooses during the course of his sentence."
The Memorandum argued that the Bureau's statutory authority to implement sentences of imprisonment should, wherever possible, be interpreted harmoniously with statutory requirements imposed upon
federal courts. 97 In accordance with such "harmonious interpretation," the Memorandum concluded that the Bureau's practice concerning direct placement in CCCs was "unlawful" on the grounds that
community confinement does not constitute "imprisonment"9 8 and
that the Bureau lacks the statutory authority to designate prisoners
directly to community confinement centers. 99
From the outset, the Memorandum acknowledged the Bureau's
practice of placing "low-risk and nonviolent" offenders in a form of
community confinement for a short sentence of imprisonment.1 0 0
Suggesting, however, that the Bureau requested DOJ guidance concerning its authority to designate such a placement, 10 1 the Memorandum engaged in separate analyses of the statutory authority granted to
the federal courts and to the Bureau concerning sentencing. The
95 By analogy, one might infer that it would be inappropriate to suggest, as the DOJ
did, that the restrictions concerning prerelease placement as articulated in section 5C1.1
of the Guidelines should apply more broadly to CCCs, and thus should function as a restriction upon the Bureau's power to place individuals directly into the community component of a CCC. See infra Parts II, III.B.1.
96
Memorandum, supra note 17, at 1.
97
98

99
100

Id. at 5-6.
Id. at 3.

Id. at 6-8.
Id. at 1.

101
See id. Several courts have noted that it seems disingenuous for the DOJ to suggest
that its guidance was requested in this instance. See, e.g., Monahan v. Winn, 276 F. Supp. 2d
196, 205 n.9 (D. Mass. 2003).
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Memorandum's emphasis upon "clear general statutory authority"10 2
appears to set aside previous Bureau statements and guidance manuals, focusing instead upon statutory interpretation and the resultant
narrowing of the Bureau's discretion to designate imprisonment for
10 3
individuals sentenced by the courts.
The Memorandum first examined whether the Guidelines grant
federal courts the authority to order individuals to serve any part of
their sentences in community confinement. 10 4 Following a brief history of the Guidelines and a discussion of the limited circumstances in
which judges might depart from them, 0 5 the Memorandum specifically addressed the terms of sections 5Cl.l (d) and (f) of the Guidelines and concluded that the plain language of section 5C1.1 did not
provide federal courts authority "to substitute community confinement for any portion of the sentence" of Zone C or D defendants, the
individuals who require the most severe sentences. 10 6 The Memorandum averred that federal courts of appeals cases have "uniformly determined that community confinement does not constitute
'imprisonment"' for Zone C or D defendants, 10 7 and further insisted
upon distinguishing imprisonment and community confinement such
that community confinement could never be understood as a substitute for imprisonment. 108 In sum, the Memorandum asserted that
federal courts violate the Guidelines if they recommend community
confinement for any offender with a Zone C or D sentence. 0 9
Shifting its attention from the courts to the Bureau, the Memorandum's second section examined whether the Bureau, upon its own
initiative or upon judicial recommendation, might place Zone C or D
defendants in CCCs. 11 Contending that the Sentencing Reform Act
of 1984 not only commissioned the creation of the Guidelines, but
Memorandum, supra note 17, at 1.
See id. at 1-9.
Id. at 1-4.
105
Id. at 2 (noting that the court may depart from the Guidelines only where the
criteria set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) are satisfied and is otherwise bound by the provisions of the Guidelines (citing Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 92 (1996); Stinson v.
United States, 508 U.S. 36, 42 (1993))).
106
Id. at 3. The Memorandum asserts that Zone C sentences require the minimum
term to be satisfied "either by a simple 'sentence of imprisonment,'" as per section
5C1.1 (d)(1), or by a sentence including a "'term of supervised release with a condition
that substitutes community confinement or home detention,'" as per section 5C1.1(d) (2).
Id. at 2. Regarding Zone D sentences, the DOJ concluded that section 5C.1(f) requires
the "minimum term be satisfied by a simple sentence of imprisonment." Id.
107
Id. at 3 (contending that "'[i]mprisonment is the condition of being removed from
the community and placed in prison, whereas "community confinement" is the condition
of being controlled and restricted within the community"' (quoting United States v. Adler,
52 F.3d 20, 21 (2d Cir. 1995))).
102

1o
104

108
109
110

See id.

Id. at 4.
Id.
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also "rewrote the provisions governing [the Bureau's] implementation
of sentences,"1 1 ' the Memorandum submitted that it was "especially
appropriate that [the Bureau's and courts' authority under Title 18]
be construed to produce a harmonious interpretation."' 12 The Memorandum argued that this interpretation of the Bureau's authority sustained Congress's overarching objective of eliminating arbitrary
disparities in punishment. 1 13 This general interpretation undoubtedly comported with the DOJ's insistence that this Memorandum did
not represent an arbitrary "policy" change, but rather a careful effort
to restrict Bureau discretion to the limits Congress intended. The
DOJ thus characterized its action as merely an interpretation of previous practice, rather than an effort to create a new administrative rule
with the effect of law in the absence of legally binding authority to do
so.

114

The DOJ's arguments naturally suggested two potential limitations on the Bureau's authority under 18 U.S.C. § 3621, the Bureau's
authorizing statute.1 15 If, as the DOJ contended, placing prisoners directly in CCCs does not constitute imprisonment, the Bureau's act of
designating a prisoner directly to a CCC interferes with a court's sentencing power, effectively replacing the court's sentence with a sentence of the Bureau's own choosing. 116 In the alternative, temporarily
granting the argument that direct placement in CCCs does constitute
imprisonment, the DOJ contended that Bureau discretion cannot be
truly "unfettered."1' 17 In the spirit of harmonious interpretation, the
Memorandum insisted that the Bureau's power under § 3621 must be
restricted in accordance with the Guidelines. 118 The Memorandum
also argued that § 3621 was restricted by § 3624(c), which permits the
Bureau to transfer a prisoner to a prerelease program for a portion of
his sentence not to exceed six months or ten percent of his sentence, 1 19 because § 3624(c) specifies the point in a prisoner's sentence when the Bureau gains the authority to transfer a prisoner to a
CCC. 120 Allowing the Bureau to have "unfettered discretion" to place

inmates in CCCs would, according to the DOJ, permit the Bureau to
111

Id. at 6.

112

Id.

113

Id,

114 See discussion infra Part III.B.
115 18 U.S.C. § 3621 (2000).
116 See Memorandum, supra note 17, at 6 ("[S] ection 3621(b) does not authorize [the
Bureau] to subvert that statutory scheme [that gives courts the authority to sentence prisoners] by placing in community confinement an offender who has received a sentence of
imprisonment.").
117 See id. at 7, 8 & n.8.
118

Id. at6.

119
120

18 U.S.C. § 3624(c).
See Memorandum, supra note 17, at 7.
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nullify these statutory restrictions and to extend the Bureau's sphere
12
of influence far beyond that which Congress intended.'
The crux of the Memorandum's revised policy lies in the DOJ's
position that CCCs are not places of imprisonment "within the ordinary meaning of that phrase."' 2 2 The Memorandum criticized that
CCC residents, "although still in federal custody," are not confined to
a CCC for the entire day, but rather are permitted to leave for employment, training, and education. 123 The Memorandum recounted that
inmates in CCCs normally become eligible for weekend and evening
leave passes after the second week of confinement, criticizing that
such provisions are incongruous with traditional conceptions of incarceration.1 24 Reasoning that if confinement in a CCC is not imprisonment, then the Bureau cannot place a prisoner in one under § 3621,
the Memorandum formally concluded that the Bureau lacks statutory
authority to place a Zone C or D offender directly in community
1 25
confinement.
III
INTERPRETATION OR RULE?

UNMASKING THE

DOJ's

"POLICY"

ON PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE GROUNDS

Under the guidance of the APA, courts apply different levels of
deference to administrative rules depending on their classification as
interpretive rules or substantive rules. 126 Thus, in order to under121
122
123

Id.
Id.

Id. While facilitating an inmate's transition to society through training programs in
an effort to curb recidivism, the prerelease component is still considered imprisonment by
the Guidelines and is credited toward an inmate's imprisonment term. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5C1.1 cmt. n.4(B) (2001) ("[The court] may impose a sentence
of imprisonment that includes a term of supervised release with a condition requiring community confinement or home detention." (emphasis added)). The DOJ's argument, suggesting that permission to leave for educational and training purposes fundamentally
contradicts the traditional conception of imprisonment, does not comport with the prerelease component. See Memorandum, supra note 17, at 7. On one hand, under the prerelease component, the DOJ treats placement in a CCC as imprisonment, properly
crediting prison time; on the other hand, the DOJ suggests that time in the community
corrections component, which is in fact more restrictive, does not constitute imprisonment. See id. at 5, 7; discussion infra Part IV.A.
124
Memorandum, supra note 17, at 7. Again, the Memorandum appears to confuse
the two components of CCC programs, extrapolating that options available to those individuals in the prerelease component are available to all residing in a CCC. See id.; Program
Statement No. 7310.04, supra note 13, at 4-5 (delineating between the prelease and community corrections components of a CCC).
125
See Memorandum, supra note 17, at 8-9.
126
See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2000) (specifying that traditional rulemaking procedures are
not necessary for "interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice"); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944)
(establishing the appropriate level of deference courts should grant to agency
interpretations).
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stand whether APA requirements bind the DOJ's new "policy" and
what deference the court must apply when evaluating the reasonableness of the DOJ's action, an effort must be made to determine
whether the "policy" constitutes an interpretive rule or a substantive
rule. 1 2 7 An agency's assertion that its actions constitute an interpretation is not determinative.1 28 Instead, the proper question is whether
the DOJ's reinterpretation of § 3621 is fairly encompassed within the
t 29
statute or whether it introduces new rights or duties.
A.

Rules, Interpretations, and Hazarding the Smog 1 30 to Discern
the Difference

Administrative law affords the DOJ, in its capacity as the federal
agency overseeing Bureau procedure and practice, the power to make
reasonable interpretive choices concerning the statutes it administers
without judicial interference. 31 The Supreme Court aptly noted in

United States v. Mead Corp. that
[i]mplementation of a statute may occur in formal adjudication or
the choice to defend against judicial challenge; it may occur in a
central board or office or in dozens of enforcement agencies dotted
across the country; its institutional lawmaking may be confined to
the resolution of minute detail or extend to legislative rulemaking
on matters intentionally left by Congress to be worked out at the
132
agency level.
Regardless of the form that implementation of a statute may take,
however, it is vulnerable to substantive and procedural review by the
33
courts.1
Holding agencies to due-process standards that appear judicial in
nature,134 the APA matches a set of procedures to each type of rule or
agency action with the objective of "assur[ing] informed administra127
See infra notes 128-46 (discussing the consequences classifying a rule as a substantive or interpretive). But cf Syncor Int'l Corp. v. Shalala, 127 F.3d 90, 93-94 (D.C. Cir.
1997) (discussing the difficulty courts face in attempting to determine whether a rule is
interpretive or substantive).
128
Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 588 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
129
See Air Transport Ass'n of Am., Inc., v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 291 F.3d 49, 55 (D.C.

Cir. 2002).
130
See Anthony, supra note 2, at 4 n.13.
131
See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227-28 (2001). The Supreme Court
approved the Bureau as the proper interpreter of the sentence-related statutes. See Reno v.
Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 60 (1995) (noting that the Bureau is the proper agency to interpret the
Bail Reform Act).
132
See 533 U.S. at 236.
See5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000).
See, e.g., Edward Rubin, It's Time to Make the Administrative ProcedureAct Administrative, 89 CORNELL L. REv. 95, 111 (2003).
133
134
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tive action and adequate protection to private interests."1 3 5 The level
of judicial intervention into agency action mirrors each rule's level of
formality, making classification of each agency action critically important. 13 6 The APA, however, defines the term "rule" very broadly and
does not distinguish between substantive and legislative rules,1 3 7 a dis138
tinction often characterized as "enshrouded in considerable smog."'

Courts have treated substantive rules that comply with extensive APA
requirements for notice and comment with a high level of deference,
known as Chevron deference, and have refrained from interfering so
long as the rule does not contradict the clear meaning of the statute
or the clear intent of Congress and so long as the interpretation is
reasonable. 139 Regarding interpretative rules, a broad category of
agency action that lacks the force of law' 40 and does not have to meet
the APA requirements of notice and comment, courts have traditionally employed the lower level of deference the Supreme Court applied
in Skidmore, which essentially grants the interpretative rule only per41
suasive authority.
The procedures that comprise an agency's rulemaking process reveal the proper classification of the agency's actions. The APA definition of rulemaking, the "agency process for formulating, amending,
or repealing a rule," 142 generally applies to substantive rules that implement a statute over which an agency has interpretive authority and
that bear the force and effect of law.1 43 Seeking to ensure all inter144
ested parties an opportunity to offer guidance and raise concerns,
the APA mandates that an agency explain the reasons for its actions
135
See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT 31 (Win. W. Gaunt & Sons 1973) (1947) [hereinafter ATrORNEY GENERAL'S
MANUAL]; see 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RicHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.10, at 282 (3d ed. 1994) ("The agency typically is in a superior position to determine what it intended when it issued a rule, how and when it intended the rule to apply,

and the interpretation of the rule that makes the most sense given the agency's purposes in
issuing the rule. Courts have significant institutional disadvantages in attempting to resolve these critical issues.").
136 See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139 (1944).
137
See5 U.S.C. § 551 (4).
138
See Anthony, supra note 2, at 4 & n.13.
139 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45
(1984).
140
This broad category of agency actions includes opinion letters, guidance manuals,
and policy statements. See Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000).
141
See 323 U.S. at 140 (noting that rulings, interpretations, and opinions, "while not
controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for
guidance").
142
5 U.S.C. § 551(5).
143
See Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1109 (D.C.
Cir. 1993) (citing ATrro'EY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra note 135, at 30 n.3).
144 See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c).
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regardless of whether its action enacts, amends, or repeals a rule. 145
Rulemaking thus requires an agency to demonstrate that it has "venti146
lated" all major issues of policy.

Because the APA exempts interpretive rules from the notice and
comment procedures required for substantive rules, 14 7 interpretive
rules permit agencies to immediately assume responsibility for interpreting legislation without managing lengthy notice and comment
procedures.148 In contrast to substantive rules, interpretive rules "advise the public of the agency's construction of the statutes and rules
150
which it administers" 149 and do not bear the force and effect of law.
Interpretive rules explain, but do not supplement, existing substantive
law.15 ' By designating an action with the label "interpretive rule," an
agency not only exempts itself from APA requirements, but also formally asserts that the interpretation does not project a new legal effect
of its own. 152 As such, an agency that labels its action an "interpretive
rule" implicitly announces that its action reasonably falls within the
umbrella of an existing regulation. As the Supreme Court specified in
Skidmore, the weight of such an interpretation in court depends upon
the "thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all
those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to
153
control."
Apart from procedural and philosophical distinctions, the fundamental factor distinguishing substantive and interpretive rules centers
on "whether the interpretation itself carries the 'force and effect of
law' or rather whether it spells out a duty fairly encompassed within
145
See 5 U.S.C. § 551 (5). The APA requires a published notice in the FederalRegister, as
well as a period of comment that gives "interested persons an opportunity to participate in
the rule making through submission of written data, views, or arguments with or without
opportunity for oral presentation." Id. § 553(c). The agency must incorporate these comments in a "concise general statement of their basis or purpose," publicly demonstrating
that the agency proceeded as a reasonable decision-maker. Id.
146
See United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 252 (2d Cir.
1977).
147
5 U.S.C. § 553(b).
148
See Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Interpretive
rules preserve agencies' flexibility to act more freely and efficiently where substantive
rights are not in question. See id.; Todd D. Rakoff, The Choice Between Formal and Informal
Modes of Administrative Regulation, 52 ADMIN. L. REv. 159, 162 (2000) (commenting on the
general notion that an "issue will graduate to a more formal process of rulemaking or
adjudication" if there is substantial disagreement concerning a regulation).
149
Am. Mining Cong., 995 F.2d at 1109 (citing ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra
note 135, at 30 n.3).
150
See Shalala v. Guernsey Mem'l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 99 (1995).
151
See Nat'l Family Planning & Reprod. Health Ass'n v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 227, 236-37
(D.C. Cir. 1992); Anthony, supra note 2, at 13.
152
See Anthony, supra note 2, at 13.
153
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
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the regulation that the interpretation purports to construe." 154 In
part, one may determine whether a rule is substantive or interpretive
based on how closely the agency tied its interpretation to the actual
language of the statute or regulation the rule interprets.155 On these
grounds, an interpretation of general terms in a statute, such as "equitable" or "fair," is likely to be a substantive rule that introduces a new
right or duty with legal effect. 156 An interpretation based upon more
specific wording, without which the government could arguably rely
on the regulation itself and reach the same outcome, is likely to be a
proper interpretive rule exempt from APA notice and comment requirements. 157 This linguistic analysis assists one in assessing whether
an interpretation merely "spells out a duty fairly encompassed within
the [statute or] regulation,"' 5 8 or whether the interpretation strays
outside the confines of the statute or regulation with the force and
59
effect of law.'
A more substantive test of whether an interpretation is "fairly encompassed" within the statute or regulation may be whether the parties, in the absence of the agency's interpretation, would have
adequate legislative guidance to perform their duties. 1 60 Substantial
deviation from previous interpretations, even those previously characterized as "fairly encompassed" within the substantive regulation, may
also suggest that an interpretation actually supplements the law by imposing new rights or duties. 16 1 Put another way, the test of an interpretive rule may be whether its meaning is "self-evident in the statute"
and whether the rule still permits parties to exercise their own discretion. 16 2 On these grounds, the fate of the DOJ Memorandum's procedural and substantive validity rests on whether it is a "mere effort at
interpretive guidance" or a "rulemaking exercise designed to reshape

154 Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 588 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(quoting Am. Mining Cong., 995 F.2d at 1109).
155
See id.
156
Id.
157
See id.
158
Id.
159
See id.
160
See Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1112 (D.C.
Cir. 1993).
161 See Shalala v. Guernsey Mern'l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 100 (1995) (commenting that
rulemaking is required where an interpretation "adopt[s] a new position inconsistent with
...existing regulations"); Alaska Prof'l Hunters Ass'n v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 177 F.3d
1030, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1999) ("When an agency has given its regulation a definitive interpretation, and later significantly revises that interpretation, the agency has in effect
amended its rule, something it may not accomplish without notice and comment.").
162 Monahan v. Winn, 276 F. Supp. 2d 196, 212-13 (D. Mass. 2003) (suggesting that a
rule that binds the agency and third parties is substantive rather than interpretive).
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the scope of a statutory provision through an administrative statement
16 3
of lawmaking."
B.

The DOJ "Policy": A Substantive Rule in Disguise
1.

The DOJ's Interpretationsare Misguided and Not Fairly
Encompassed Within 18 US.C. § 3621

Despite the DOJ's insistence that it merely reinterpreted § 3621,
the Memorandum clearly strayed outside of the broad language of
§ 3621 and "drastically truncate [s] [the Bureau's] discretion in a manner that is in no way 'outlined' in the applicable statute." 164 The Memorandum consistently disregarded the distinction between CCCs' two
separate components, treating the community corrections and prerelease components as one. 165 In so doing, the Memorandum not only
misinterpreted the DOJ's own documents, 6 6 but fundamentally reinterpreted the plain terms of § 3621 and improperly stretched the
terms of the Guidelines to limit the Bureau's discretion. 167 The Memorandum did not outline an interpretation "in the absence of [which]
there would... be an adequate legislative basis ... to ensure performance of duties. 1

68

Quite to the contrary, the Bureau consistently

placed prisoners in the community corrections component of CCCs
1 69
for over forty years without the assistance of this interpretation.
Collectively, these factors illustrate that the Memorandum formulated
a substantive rule, one that is invalid for failing to comply with
170
mandatory APA notice and comment procedures.
The Memorandum departed from the plain terms of § 3621 by
declaring that CCCs do not qualify as penal or correctional facilities
and that placing prisoners in CCCs is therefore unlawful. 171 The
Memorandum circumvents § 3621's broad instruction that "[t]he Bureau may designate ...

any available penal or correctional facility,"'

72

163 See Mallory v. United States, No. Civ.A. 03-10220-DPW, 2003 WL 1563764, at *2 (D.
Mass. Mar. 25, 2003) (holding that the DOJ Memorandum was procedurally invalid for
failure to comply with notice and comment, but reserving judgment on the substantive
merits of the Memorandum).
164 See lacaboni v. United States, 251 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1039 (D. Mass. 2003).
165
See supra discussion supra Part I.C.2.
166 See id.; infra Part IV.C.
167
See supra notes 110-21 and accompanying text (discussing the Memorandum's attempts to use the Guidelines to restrict the Bureau's discretion to designate prisoners to
penal or correctional institutions under 18 U.S.C. § 3621); supra notes 53-55 (noting that
the Guidelines were intended to bind the federal courts only).
168 See Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1112 (D.C.
Cir. 1993); supra notes 156-57 and accompanying text.
169
See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
170
The DOJ made no effort to comply with the APA's notice and comment procedures for substantive rules, mandated by 5 U.SC. § 553. See discussion supra Part II.
171 See discussion infra Part [V.A.
172
18 US.C. § 3621(b) (2000) (emphasis added).
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arguing instead that a CCC does not constitute a form of imprisonment by virtue of the fact that it releases prisoners for employment
and related programs. 173 The general terms of § 3621, however, do
174
not delimit the Bureau's discretion in such a manner.
Kathleen Hawk Sawyer underscored the Bureau's traditional interpretation of § 3621 during a 1996 interview in which she encouraged judges to visit institutions and consider all forms of
incarceration, noting that the Bureau's mission is to
place offenders at facilities providing appropriate security that are
as close as possible to their homes, to maintain balance in the inmate population throughout the system, and to use [Bureau] resources wisely by ensuring that inmates requiring only low security
are not housed in higher security institutions that cost more to
175
operate.
Reinforcing this notion, as several courts aptly noted, imprisonment
does not require "that all those in custody of the [Bureau] must be
confined in structures resembling Alcatraz or Sing Sing,"' 76 nor does
a penal facility necessitate "barbed wire and absolute constraints on
liberty-and nothing else. ' 177 Rather, the language of § 3621 itself
"rules out almost no imaginable facility or institution, publicly or pri'178
vately owned.
The Memorandum fundamentally misinterprets the scope of the
Guidelines and misapplies restrictions that were intended to bind only
judges. 179 The Memorandum relies heavily upon section 5C1.1 of the
Guidelines and 18 U.S.C. § 3624 to suggest that placement in a CCC
does not constitute imprisonment, insisting that these statutes' prescriptions concerning the prerelease component of CCCs apply generally to CCCs as a whole. 8 0 The DOJ's efforts to disregard the
distinction between the prerelease and community corrections components is particularly ironic, given that the DOJ's official documents
instruct judges that these components are distinct. 18 1 The Guidelines
never address the Bureau as their intended audience, nor do they dis173
174
175

See Memorandum, supra note 17, at 7.
See discussion infra Part IV.A.
See An Interview with Bureau of Prisons Director Kathleen M. Hawk, supra note 8.

Byrd v. Moore, 252 F. Supp. 2d 293, 301 (W.D.N.C. 2003).
Monahan v. Winn, 276 F. Supp. 2d 196, 206 (D. Mass. 2003).
See Byrd, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 301.
See suranotes 53-55 and accompanying text (discussing Congress's intent that the
Guidelines bind only judges); see also Howard v. Ashcroft, 248 F. Supp. 2d 518, 525 (M.D.
La. 2003) (criticizing that the DOJ has, "with respect to sentencing discretion, assigned the
judiciary and the Bureau as bunkmates under the guidance of the Sentencing Commission's camp counselor").
176
177
178
179

180

See Memorandum, supra note 17, at 6-7.

181 See, e.g., Program Statement No. 7310.04, supra note 13, at 4 (stating that a "CCC
meets the definition of a 'penal or correctional facility'" and that the community corrections component is a restrictive form of confinement).
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cuss the community corrections component of CCCs. t8 2 Thus, even

without examining the precedential value of the DOJ's previous representations, i8 3 it is clear that the Memorandum's reliance upon guidance outside of the plain terms of the statute cannot be "fairly
encompassed" within 18 U.S.C. § 3621.
2.

The DOJ Masks a New Legal Effect Under the Veil of an
Interpretive Rule

The Memorandum imposes rights or obligations "'the basic tenor
of which [are] not already outlined in the law itself",1 8

4

and therefore

constitutes a substantive rule with the force and effect of law. The
DOJ's characterization of this action as an interpretive rule or "policy"
stands in sharp contrast to over forty years of reliance on the plain
terms of § 3621.185 By contrast, Bureau and DOJ documents, guidance manuals to federal courts, and representations to Congress
prior to December 2002 more aptly illustrate guidance that is encompassed within the statute itself.
The statutory and legislative history of § 3621, as well as its predecessor statute, § 4082, supports the argument that the language and
intent of § 3621 are unambiguous. Several factors are particularly telling in this analysis. First, a 1965 amendment to the predecessor statute, adding the term "facility" after the term "institution," specifically
defined the term "facility" to include a "residential community treatment center." 18 6 Legislative history highlights the continuity between
§ 4082 and § 3621, stating that § 3261(b) permitted the Bureau to
designate prisoners to appropriate facilities upon considering specified factors 18 7 and did not intend to change preexisting law concerning the breadth of the Bureau's authority.1 88 Nonetheless, the DOJ
Memorandum selectively interpreted "minor statutory changes" to introduce a policy that "[b]y all accounts ...

would alter a sentencing

landscape that existed long before the Sentencing Guidelines hit the
scene."

189

See supra text accompanying notes 53-54, 71-72.
See discussion infra Part IV.C.
Iacaboni v. United States, 251 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1039 (D.Mass. 2003) (quoting La
Casa Del Convaleciente v. Sullivan, 965 F.2d 1175, 1178 (1st Cir. 1992)); see Shalala v.
Guernsey Mem'l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 100 (1995) (indicating that an agency effectively
amends the substance of a statute when it "adopt[s] a new position inconsistent with any of
the [agency's] existing regulations," regardless of whether the agency acknowledges such a
change).
185
See supra notes 9, 78-81 and accompanying text.
186
lacaboni,251 F. Supp. 2d at 1025. The court also notes that "residential community
treatment center" is an older name for "community confinement center." Id.
187
See id. (citing S. REP. 98-225, at 141-42 (1983), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3182, 3324).
188 See id. (citing McCarthy v. Doe, 146 F.3d 118, 123 n.2 (2d Cir. 1998)).
189 See Howard v. Ashcroft, 248 F. Supp. 2d 518, 545 (M.D. La. 2003).
182
183
184
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If Congress had wanted to restrict the Bureau's discretion, it had
ample opportunity to amend the old law, to insert this specification in
§ 3621, or to provide commentary to this end. 90 Similarly, the Commission might have issued a policy statement specifically restricting
the Bureau's practices concerning CCC placement.' 9 1 Neither Congress nor the Commission have ever issued such statements or guidance.1 9 2 To the contrary, only ten years prior to the DOJ
Memorandum in question, the DOJ itself published a document indicating that § 3621 (b) offers no statutory basis for distinguishing between residential community facilities and secure facilities or for
193
limiting the Bureau's designation authority based on legal history.
Taken together, the broad wording of § 3621 (b), the explicit wording
of the predecessor statute § 4082, the legislative history indicating
continuity between the two, and the lack of objection by the Commission or Congress over several generations 194 only serve to strengthen
the conclusion that Congress did not intend to restrict the Bureau's
authority to designate inmates for direct placement in CCCs.
The DOJ Memorandum thus binds the Bureau to a new interpretation bearing the force of law, all the while ignoring "the positive authorization given the [Bureau] to consider any appropriate facility, as
well as the complete absence of any hint of a prohibition" against authorizing placement in a CCC.19 5 Under the preexisting practice,
judges' recommendations concerning CCCs did not bind the Bureau's discretion; the Bureau always retained the power to disregard a
judge's recommendation. 96 The Memorandum, however, removed
all Bureau discretion concerning direct CCC placement, 19 7 setting
190
See id. at 546; lacaboni, 251 F. Supp. 2d. at 1025.
191
See 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) (5) (2000) (directing the Bureau to consider policy statements issued by the Commission).
192 See Monahan v. Winn, 276 F. Supp. 2d 196, 207 (D. Mass. 2003) (noting that the
Commission never addressed "issues concerning the place of confinement"); lacaboni, 251
F. Supp. 2d at 1025, 1027 (stating that the Commission "could easily have condemned the
"[i]
n fact, the ...Commission has never so
practice [of CCC placement]," and noting that
much as hinted that the.., well established practice was 'unlawful'"); Howard, 248 F. Supp.
2d at 546 ("[F]ar from explicitly overriding that known practice-as of course it was and is
within the power of Congress to do-the Crime Control Act of 1984 left that practice in
place . .

").

193 See lacaboni, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 1027 (citing 16 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 65 (1992),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/quinlan.15.htm).
194 See id. at 1025-26.
195

Id. at 1026.

As a matter of practice, however, the Bureau usually complied with a court's recommendation. See An Interview with Bureau of Prisons DirectorKathleen M. Hawk, supra note 8
(indicating that the Bureau generally followed eighty percent ofjudicial recommendations
concerning the placement of inmates); see also supra text accompanying notes 34, 84.
197 See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 290 F.3d 377, 382 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (suggesting that a statement that automatically restricts a decision-maker's proper discretion is
a binding statement, which creates rights or obl;gations); Chamber of Commerce v. U.S.
196
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forth "a uniform, predetermined outcome that admits of no exception."' 9 8 The DOJ's "policy" denied the Bureau the fundamental discretion that it had exercised for over forty years' 9 9 and which
Congress granted to it in the broad language of § 3621.200 Removing
the Bureau's long-standing discretion to designate inmates directly to
CCCs indicates that the Memorandum introduced a substantive rule
20
with the effect of law, not merely an interpretive rule. '
3.

The "Policy" is Procedurally Invalid for Failure to Comply with
APA Requirements

The APA prescribes that when formulating, amending, or repealing a rule, an agency must comply with mandatory due-process requirements. 20 2 The APA prohibits the DOJ from introducing a rule
with the force and effect of law without first inviting the comments of
20 3
all interested persons and responding to their rational inquiries.
Despite the DOJ's insistence upon labeling the Memorandum an interpretive rule, the Memorandum strays far beyond the language and
intentions of § 3621. A rule that departs from the plain meaning of
the statute, relies upon other statutes in search of "harmonious interpretation," 20 4 and is not "fairly encompassed" within the existing statute 20 5 cannot purport to merely provide guidance for agency decisionmaking. It is undisputed that the DOJ failed to comply with notice
and comment procedures for substantive rules as outlined in 5 U.S.C.
§ 553.206 On these grounds, the DOJ Memorandum is procedurally
207
invalid.
Dep't of Labor, 174 F.3d 206, 213 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (commenting that a rule is binding
where it "leaves no room for discretionary choices" by agency employees).
198 See Monahan v. Winn, 276 F. Supp. 2d 196, 214 (D. Mass. 2003).
199
See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
200 See discussion supra Part IB; infra Part IV.A.
Ashkenazi v. Att'y Gen., 246 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6 n.9 (D.D.C. 2003) (finding that where
201
the new policy is "not flexible and does not permit [the Bureau] to exercise any discretion," it has the force of law and is "not merely interpretive"), vacated as moot, 346 F.3d 191
(D.C. Cir. 2003).
202 See 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (2000); discussion supra Part III.A.
203 See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000); Mallory v. United States, No. Civ.A. 03-10220-DPW, 2003
WL 1563764, at *2 (D. Mass. Mar. 25, 2003) (opining that the Memorandum "is no mere
effort at interpretive guidance but rather a rulemaking exercise designed to reshape the
scope of a statutory provision through an administrative statement of lawmaking").
204
See Memorandum, supra note 17, at 6.
205 See supra Part III.B.1.
206 See supra Part II.
207 A determination of procedural invalidity does not imply that the DOJ lacks the
power to reverse its original interpretation. Rather, if the DOJ wants to reintroduce this
policy, it must comply with APA requirements for rulemaking. See discussion infra Part
IV.B-C.
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IV
DOJ's "POLICY" AS
AN INTERPRETIVE RULE THROUGH MEAD AND SKIDMORE

ASSESSING THE REASONABLENESS OF THE

Even if the DOJ properly classified the Memorandum as an interpretive rule, thereby securing its procedural validity by avoiding APA
requirements, this label does not shield the DOJ "policy" from judicial
scrutiny. Indeed, although the DOJ Memorandum averred that its reinterpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 3621 corrects a mistaken interpretation,
precedent is unsettled concerning whether additional process is due
for reinterpretations of long-standing, documented policy. 20 8 Further, the label of "interpretive rule" exposes the DOJ's "policy" to a
more searching judicial review for reasonableness, since the rule was
not vetted through a notice and comment process. 20 9 A court may
substitute its own interpretation for an agency's in the case of interpretive rules on the grounds that the court's view is more reasonable. 210 As such, interpretive rules have the power to persuade, but not
to control or bind, the court. 2 11 Thus, a court must determine
whether the DOJ "policy," even if properly classified as an interpretive
rule, is nonetheless either procedurally or substantively invalid.
As the final authority concerning statutory construction, 212 courts
face a complicated balancing act when assessing interpretive rules.
On one hand, they must assess whether "Congress has directly spoken
to the precise question at issue" 21 3 or whether Congress delegated to
the agency the authority to regulate a gap between two statutes or
rules. 2 14 On the other hand, carefully weighing an individual agency's
expertise and track record, courts must also assess whether the agency
acted with the proper degree of care based on the "consistency, formality, and relative expertness, and [ ] the persuasiveness of the
2 15
agency's position."
208
See, e.g.,
Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 586 (D.C. Cir.
1997) (suggesting that once an agency releases an interpretation of a regulation, if it
makes any substantive changes to the interpretation, the agency should follow the same
procedures required to "formally modify the regulation itself: . .. the process of notice and
comment").
209
See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139 (1944) (noting that interpretive rules
"do not constitute an interpretation of [an] Act or a standard for judging factual situations
which binds a . . .court's processes").

210
See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9
(1984) ("The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction and must
reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional intent.").
211
See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
212
Cheuron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9.
213
Id. at 842.
214 See id.at 843-44; United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001).
215 Mead, 533 U.S. at 228 (citations omitted); Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140 (noting that the
"weight [accorded to an administrative] judgment... will depend upon the thoroughness
evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and

20051

INTERPRETIVE RULES

Part IV will first employ traditional tools of statutory construction
2 16
to assess whether Congress answered the precise issue in question:
whether a CCC constitutes punishment. Further, it will evaluate the
breadth of authority Congress delegated to the DOJ to regulate Bureau policy. Finding that Congress purposefully defined punishment
in a very broad manner and did not restrict the Bureau's judgment to
designate inmates' imprisonment, Part IV will then study the precedential value of earlier Bureau and DOJ documents that directly contradict the policy espoused in the Memorandum. It will discuss the
unsettled precedent concerning whether reinterpretations, even legitimate ones, require additional due-process procedures. Part IV will
conclude that the DOJ Memorandum is unreasonable and both procedurally and substantively invalid.
A.

Understanding the Plain Meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 3621:
Punishment and CCCs Defined

The Bureau's "policy," as outlined in the DOJ Memorandum,
does not comport with the plain meaning of § 3621. Relying on the
textual analysis of four courts, which determined that they had jurisdiction to hear appeals of the DOJ's administrative decision, 21 7 this
Note concludes that the common usage and dictionary definitions of
the terms of the statute, as well as its relevant legislative history,
demonstrate that Congress crafted a purposefully broad definition of
imprisonment that comfortably includes CCCs. This Note opines that
the DOJ Memorandum not only mischaracterized the history of CCCs
but also 218
placed undue emphasis on the Guidelines in support of its
"policy,"
and misinterpreted their intended scope. 219
The text of § 3621 (a) unequivocally grants the Bureau custody of
' 220
a "person who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment."
The statute further specifies that "[t]he Bureau may designate any
available penal or correctionalfacility that meets minimum standards of
later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking
power to control").
216
See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9.
217
See Monahan v. Winn, 276 F. Supp. 2d 196, 205 (D. Mass. 2003); lacaboni v. United
States, 251 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1035-36 (D. Mass. 2003); Byrd v. Moore, 252 F. Supp. 2d 293,
297 (W.D.N.C. 2003); Howard v. Ashcroft, 248 F. Supp. 2d 518, 534 (M.D. La. 2003); supra
note 35 and accompanying text (discussing that many courts dismissed cases on the
grounds that the petitioners had not exhausted their administrative remedies).
218
See Iacaboni, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 1024 (commenting that the DOJ's analysis, beginning "with a comer of the Sentencing Guidelines, then working backwards to the controlling general statute," utilizes "a clever rhetorical tactic, [but] begins the wrong way
around").
219
See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
220
18 U.S.C. § 3621 (a) (2000); see Monahan, 276 F. Supp. 2d at 205-07; Byrd, 252 F.
Supp. 2d at 300-01.
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health and habitability established by the Bureau." 22 1 Surmising that
"[i] t could not be clearer from [the language of § 3621] that Congress
granted the Bureau a rather broad discretion to appoint the places
where prisoners will serve their terms of imprisonment," the court in
Howard v. Ashcrofl opined that "the only apparent limitation on the
Bureau is that it choose a place that is a 'penal or correctional facility.'

"222

Reinforcing this characterization, the court in Byrd v. Moore

contended that the language of § 3621 "rules out almost no imagina2 23
ble facility or institution, public or privately owned."
Looking to dictionaries for technical guidance, at least two courts
concluded that the terms "penal" and "correctional" do not limit Bureau discretion concerning CCC placement, but rather embrace the
traditional conception of CCC placement, both in principle and in
practice. 2 24 According to the Oxford English Dictionary, something is
properly characterized as "penal" if it is any of the following:
Of, pertaining to, or relating to punishment. (a.) Having as its object the infliction of punishment, punitive; prescribing or enacting
the punishment to be inflicted for an offence or transgression....
(e.) Used or appointed as a place of punishment. (f.) Involving,
connected with, or characterized by, a penalty or legal punishment.
(g.) Of, pertaining to, or subject to the penal laws, penal servitude,
2 25
etc.
Similarly, the American HeritageDictionary defines "penal" as "relating
to, or prescribing punishment, as for breaking the law. Subject to
punishment; legally punishable: a penal offense. Serving as or constituting a means or place of punishment."' 22 6 Although the Oxford English
Dictionary is not instructive concerning the definition of "correc' 227
tional," defining it as "[o]f or pertaining to correction; corrective,"
the American Heritage Dictionary directs that the term "correctional"
22 8
means "[p]unishment intended to rehabilitate or improve."
These definitions do not mandate the type of rigid restrictions
the Memorandum emphasized. Rather than focusing on the specific
221
18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) (emphasis added); see Byrd, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 300 ("Section
3621 endows the [Bureau] with considerable discretion to designate prisoners anywhere
the [Bureau] decides is appropriate .
").
222 248 F. Supp. 2d at 538. As the court noted, no party, including the DOJ, has questioned the Bureau's discretion to set minimum standards of health and habitability. See id.
223 252 F. Supp. 2d at 301.
224 See, e.g., Monahan, 276 F. Supp. 2d at 206-08 (D. Mass. 2003); Byrd, 252 F. Supp. 2d.
at 300-02.
225

Howard, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 538 (quoting XI OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 460 (2d

ed. 1989)).
226
Id. (quoting
ed. 2000)).
227
228

AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE

1298 (4th

Id. at 539 (quoting III OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 962 (2d ed. 1989)).
Id. (quoting AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 411 (4th

ed. 2000)).
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nature of a facility or, for example, requiring restrictive confinement
without exception, these definitions characterize punishment as the
deprivation of one's liberty for some period of time on account of a
legal process. This plain-language analysis embraces CCCs as penal or
correctional facilities purporting to punish, correct, and rehabilitate
their inmates. 229 Indeed, the "plain language of § 3621 obviously covers a community confinement facility, and no whisper of anything to
the contrary can be found anywhere, in anything Congress has
230
said."
The courts' reflections on the nature and purpose of punishment
endorse the definitions noted above and stand in direct contrast to
the DOJ's conception of prison as a very specific place, "with barbed
wire and absolute constraints on liberty-and nothing else." 2 31 The
court in Iacaboninoted that " [i] n a modern penal system, it is the rare
prisoner who is immured behind six-foot-thick walls 365 days a years
[sic] like some character out of a Dumas romance, '"232 commenting
that the statutes themselves make alternate provisions such as the
prerelease component and provisions for training and education during imprisonment. 23 3 The court in Byrd v. Moore agreed that permitting an offender outside of the physical confinement of a Bureau
facility is not fundamentally inconsistent with the concept of imprisonment,234 arguing that "[s]ection 3621 certainly does not impose such
a limitation on the [Bureau's] discretion. '235 On these grounds, the
DOJ Memorandum's more restricted view of incarceration is not only
out of step with previous Bureau practice, but also out of step with the
plain language of the Bureau's enacting statute.
Section 3551 (b) articulates only three categories of authorized
sentences for individuals: a term of probation, a fine, and a term of
imprisonment. 23 6 This statute's simple sentencing structure does not
classify community confinement or other alternative placements as
anything other than sentences of imprisonment. 237 The Oxford English
Dictionary defines "imprisonment" as "[t] he action of imprisoning, or
fact or condition of being imprisoned; detention in a prison or place
of confinement; close or irksome confinement; 'forcible restraint
within bounds'; incarceration. "' 23 8 Similarly, the American Heritage Dic229
230
231
232
233

See discussion supra Part I.C.
lacaboni v. United States, 251 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1025 (D. Mass. 2003).
See Monahan v. Winn, 276 F. Supp. 2d 196, 206 (D. Mass. 2003).
lacaboni, 251 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1029 (D. Mass. 2003).
See id.

234
235

252 F. Supp. 2d 293, 301 (W.D.N.C. 2003).
Id.

236

See 18 U.S.C. § 3551(b) (2000).

See lacaboni, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 1024.
Howard v. Ashcroft, 248 F. Supp. 2d 518, 540 (M.D. La. 2003) (quoting VII OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 746 (2d. ed. 1989)).
237

238
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tionary defines "imprisonment" as "[t]o put in or as if in prison; confine." 2 39 In finding that CCCs meet these definitions, the Howard

court emphasized that the community corrections component permits inmates to leave only for employment and selected, individually
approved tasks, restricting inmates to the confines of the CCC at all
other times. 240 The Monahan court suggested that "§ 3621 (a) .

.

. ar-

guably provides the closest thing to a definition of 'imprisonment' as
one can find in the United States Code" by requiring that "' [a] person
who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment... shall be committed to the custody of the Bureau of Prisonsuntil the expiration of the term
imposed.' '"241 The Monahan court thus contended that custody,
rather than a particular locale, defines "imprisonment," finding that
this "conceptual distinction ...

is consistent with long-accepted views

on this subject."2 42 Holding that "the critical litmus is whether offenders 'always remain subject to the control of the Bureau,'"243 the Jacaboni
court agreed, concluding that Bureau custody is the "touchstone of
'imprisonment.' "244
Building upon this broad-based analysis, the Howard court assessed the definition of CCCs and suggested that the term "halfway
house," generally used to characterize CCCs, may itself be misleading. 24 5 Noting that not all CCC inmates are "halfway between jail and

home," Howard contends that the term "halfway house" "elides a distinction" between the prerelease and community corrections components offered by CCCs. 246 Using the term "CCC" in place of "halfway

house," the court acknowledged that CCCs are designed as a restrictive option punishing an inmate for a period of time, but allowing
limited privileges, including leave for employment.2 47 Although undoubtedly less confining than conventional prisons, CCCs "impose
heavily on the freedom of inmates."2 4 8 Indeed, the "degree of confine239

Id. (quoting AMERICAN

HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE

882 (4th

ed. 2000)).
240

See id. (noting, for example, that although Ms. Howard was permitted to travel to

herjob five days per week and received limited one- to three-hour passes to visit her family
or attend counseling or religious services, she was otherwise confined in a CCC, and stating

that this qualified as "confinement as most people would understand it").
241
Monahan v. Winn, 276 F. Supp. 2d 196, 206 (D. Mass. 2003) (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 3621 (a)).
242
Id. (citing Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 63-65 (1995), which held that the issue of
Bureau custody is controlling-specifically, that community confinement under Bureau
custody entities an inmate to sentencing credit, but that residence in such a facility when
released from Bureau custody does not receive such credit).
243
See lacaboni v. United States, 251 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1029 (D. Mass. 2003) (quoting

Koray, 515 U.S. at 63).
244

245
246
247
248

Id.; see Monahan, 276 F. Supp. 2d at 206.
See Howard, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 522 n.13.
Id.; see supra Part I.C (discussing the two separate components of CCCs).
Howard, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 523 n.13.
Id. at 541.
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ment is not determinative of whether.

. .

inmates are confined";2 49

CCCs properly commit inmates to the custody of the Bureau and restrict them to a facility designed to punish and rehabilitate. Bureau
program statements, as noted in Part I.C.2, confirm this analysis and
emphasize the restrictive nature of the community corrections component of CCCs.
By enumerating in § 3621 (b) several factors for the Bureau to
consider, 2 50 Congress not only permitted the Bureau to designate prisoners to the community corrections component of the CCC on its
own initiative, but also specifically instructed the Bureau to consider
"any statement by the court.., recommending a type of penal or correctionalfacility as appropriate." 251 As such, it is utterly incongruous for
the DOJ to contend that § 3624(c) and section 5C1.1 of the Guidelines direct the Bureau to designate inmates to CCCs' prerelease components for ten percent of their total sentences, crediting the time
spent there as part of their imprisonment,2 52 yet on the other hand to
argue that direct placement in a CCC does not constitute imprisonment.253 In so doing, the DOJ appears to elide the distinctions be-

tween CCC components in some circumstances and yet to
differentiate certain CCC practices at other times. Such inconsistent
and opportunistic analysis fails to offset Congress's unambiguous intent that the Bureau consider CCCs among possible placements for
sentenced offenders facing imprisonment.
Finally, in its search for explicit, positive authorization for CCC
placement, the Memorandum ignores the absence of any prohibition
against authorizing placement in a CCC. 25 4 Setting aside the DOJ's

"rather dog-eared trick of the 'artful negative," 255 at least one court
pointed out that the language of § 3621 (b) could not be any clearer
in directing the breadth of the Bureau's discretion and noted that the
search for further positive authorization is "flat chicanery."2 56 Indeed,
the Memorandum erred by relying upon selective and inconsistent
precedent; 2 57 the number of decisions actually supporting the Memo25 8
randum's contention and new "policy" is "exactly zero."

249

Id.

250

See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
lacaboni v. United States, 251 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1025 (D. Mass. 2003).
See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c) (2000).
Memorandum, supra note 17, at 3, 6-7; see Iacaboni, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 1029-30.
See Iacaboni, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 1026.
Id.
See id.

251
252

253
254
255

256

257 See id. at 1030 (noting that "decisional authority is not nearly as uniform as the
memo's selective quotations would suggest").
258 See id. at 1033.
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Probing the Breadth of the DOJ's Authority to Change
Bureau Practice

In 28 C.F.R. § 0.1, Congress clearly identifies the Bureau of Prisons as a principal organizational unit under the authority of the
DOJ. 2 5 9 Section 0.95 further details the general functions of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, including the "[p] rovision of suitable
quarters for, and safekeeping, care, and subsistence of, all persons
charged with or convicted of offenses against the United States or
help as witnesses or otherwise," 2 60 and the "[c]lassification, commitment, control, or treatment of persons committed to the custody of
the Attorney General." 2 6 1 More specifically, section 0.96 confirms that
the Director of the Bureau may perform any of the duties conferred
on the Attorney General, including "[d] esignating places of imprisonment or confinement where the sentences of prisoners shall be served
and ordering transfers from one institution or another,"2 62 and
' 263
"[e]stablishing and designating Bureau of Prisons Institutions."
Together, these provisions confirm the DOJ's direct authority
over the Bureau, as well as the breadth of the Bureau's power to designate inmates to a variety of prison facilities. Joint DOJ and Bureau
manuals and other documentation confirm this relationship and
these shared responsibilities.2 64 These authorities do not, however,
evidence whether this relationship is truly symbiotic or whether the
Memorandum represents an effort by the DOJ to reach down from
above and intervene in the daily operations of the Bureau. Former
Director Kathleen Hawk Sawyer characterized placing prisoners directly in CCCs as "deeply-rooted" even after the release of the Memorandum, 265 revealing a difference of opinion within the DOJ. Several
courts have criticized as disingenuous the Memorandum's attempt to
pose as if responding to a Bureau inquiry about its legal authority
when some at the Bureau appeared just as surprised as federal judges
by the reinterpretation. 266 Nonetheless, it remains clear that the DOJ
has authority to alter the policies of the organizational units it oversees, including the Bureau.
Irrespective of the breadth of the DOJ's power over Bureau policy, however, the DOJ lacks the authority to interpret the Sentencing
Guidelines or to "harmoniously interpret" the Guidelines alongside its
259

See 28 C.F.R. § 0.1 (2004).

260

Id. § 0.95(b).

261
262

Id. § 0.95(d); see 18 U.S.C. § 4042(a) (2) (2000).
28 C.F.R. § 0.96(c).
Id. § 0.96(p).
See supra Part I.B.
See Iacaboni, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 1022.
See text accompanying notes 16-34, 102.

263

264
265
266
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own enacting statutes. 2 67 The DOJ's efforts to interpret § 3621 in line
with section 5C1.1 of the Guidelines are misplaced and laden with
error, resting upon textual analysis and legislative history concerning
the prerelease, rather than the community corrections, component of
2 68
CCCs.
Even if Congress had intended the Guidelines to restrict the
Bureau, the instructions of section 5C1.1 still would not constitute a
"blanket prohibition against using community confinement placements." 2 69 The fact remains that the Guidelines' silence on the issue

of the community corrections component should not be interpreted
as a prohibition on judicial recommendations for direct CCC placement or an indication that the Bureau may never place individuals in
CCCs. Such analysis stretches far beyond the scope of the Guidelines
and does not heed their plain language or legislative history.
The Commission does not have the authority to limit the discretion of the Bureau, whose duties are explicitly outlined in 18 U.S.C.
§ 4042.270 The Guidelines "govern [only] what ajudge does in imposing a sentence; they do not control what the [Bureau] does after the
sentence is imposed." 271

The Commission's enabling statute gives it

authority only over the sentencing responsibilities of courts, listing the
Bureau as merely a partner in the sentencing process. 27 2 The Commission's enabling statute and the Guidelines do not discuss specific
places of imprisonment, implicitly acknowledging that this task is the
purview of the Bureau. 2 73 Consequently, it is nonsensical to suggest
that the plain language of section 5C1.1 makes decades of Bureau
27 4
placement decisions unlawful.
Finally, even if it were appropriate to apply the Guidelines to the
Bureau, proper statutory analysis concerning Bureau practice should
center on the governing statutes, because "statutes trump guidelines,
267 See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text (noting that Congress intended the
Guidelines to bind the federal courts and no one else).
268 See Program Statement No. 7310.04, supra note 13, at 4-5 (describing the distinction between the two CCC components); Memorandum, supra note 17, at 7-8 (describing
inmates' relative freedom at the prerelease stage as one of the reasons the DOJ did not
consider confinement in a CCC to constitute imprisonment).
269
See Iacaboni, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 1033. The court also notes that the language of
section 5C1.1, when discussing the prerelease component, does not say that the minimum
term will be followed by community confinement, but rather that the minimum term of a
prescribed sentence may be satisfied by "'a sentence of imprisonment that includes a term
of supervised release with a condition that substitutes community confinement,'" suggesting that community confinement itself is a form of imprisonment. Id. at 1034 (quoting
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5C1.1 (c) (2) (2001)).
270
See 18 U.S.C. § 4042 (2000).
271
Iacaboni, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 1033.
272
See Howard v. Ashcroft, 248 F. Supp. 2d 518, 542 (M.D. La. 2003).
273
See 28 U.S.C. § 994(g) (2000) (specifying only that the Commission consider "the
nature and capacity of the penal, correctional, and other facilities and services available").
274
See lacaboni, 251 F. Supp. 2d. at 1033-35.
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not vice versa. '275 The Jacaboni court noted that the Supreme Court
"could not have been more emphatic" in directing that regardless of
the breadth of discretion that Congress granted the Commission to
formulate sentencing guidelines, the Commission must nonetheless
"bow to the specific directives of Congress. '276 As such, even if the
Commission were steadfastly committed to forcing a distinction between community confinement and imprisonment, such a directive
could not restrict the discretion of the Bureau, whose primary authority lies in § 3621.277 Significantly, § 3621 (b) does not instruct the Bureau to consider the Guidelines themselves, but only "policy
statements" issued by the Commission. 278 Not only is the instruction
to the Bureau permissive, indicating that the Bureau may consider any
of the enumerated factors,2 79 but, more directly, the Commission has
never issued a policy statement concerning community confinement
28 0
placements.
The language of § 3621 clearly grants the Bureau broad discretion to commit offenders to any facility it deems appropriate. 28 ' To
date, no court, either at the trial or appellate level, has held to the
contrary.28 2 As the lacaboni court so cogently notes, "The [Bureau]
may use its discretion in various ways; it may not, through an erroneous interpretation of its powers, attempt to divest itself of the discretion Congress has given it."283 Considering the intended scope of the
Guidelines, the Bureau's enacting statutes, and relevant precedent, it
would be improper to permit the Guidelines to trump unambiguous
statutory language. The Commission and Guidelines do not wield
power over the Bureau, and thus, even in the spirit of "harmonious
interpretation,"' 284 they should not encourage the DOJ to divest the
Bureau of the broad discretion Congress delegated to it.

275

Id. at 1024.

276
277
278
279
280

Id.
See
See
See
See

(citing United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751, 757 (1997)).
Howard, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 543.
18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) (2000).
id.
Monahan v. Winn, 276 F. Supp. 2d 196, 207 (D. Mass. 2003); Iacaboni, 251 F.
Supp. 2d at 1027.
281
See 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b); supra note 67 and accompanying text.
282 Cf Howard, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 544 (noting that the government could not produce
cases addressing the appropriate question: "whether community confinement is a form of
imprisonment under [§ 3621, which] fleshes out the concept of 'place of imprisonment'
by using the term 'any penal or correctional facility"').
283
251 F. Supp. 2d at 1038.
284 See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
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The DOJ Memorandum Lacks the Power to Persuade the
Courts
1. Dissecting the Power to Persuade

An agency's interpretation of the statutes it administers generally
warrants judicial deference, so long as the agency gives "effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. '28 5 As noted in Part
III.A, however, agency interpretations in the form of opinion letters or
interpretative rules merit judicial deference only to the extent that
they are persuasive 28 6 and only when the statutory language is ambiguous. 28 7 The analyses in Parts III.A, III.B, and IV.A argue that the language of § 3621 is not ambiguous regarding the breadth of the
Bureau's authority or the definition of imprisonment. For this reason, the flexibility of an interpretive rule or opinion on this issue is
rather limited.
A court may defer to an agency's interpretation of a statute because of the agency's presumed familiarity or expertise in a particular
area 28 8 but is in no way bound by an agency's previous representations
or interpretations. 28 9 Agency interpretations represent "a body of ex290
perience and informed judgment" upon which a court may rely.
However, courts need not uphold an agency policy "that merely satisfies the test of reasonableness."' 29 1 Rather, courts may exercise their
own judgment and defer to the agency's interpretation "only to the
extent that those interpretations have the 'power to persuade."' 292 In
the end, "[e]ach case must stand on its own facts," and the weight of
any agency interpretation hinges upon "the thoroughness evident in
its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it
293
power to persuade, if lacking power to control."
285 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984).
286 See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944); 1 CHARLES H. KOCH, JR.,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRAcrICE § 4.11, at 326 (2d ed. 1997) ("[L]egislative rules are

binding on courts as an extension of legislative power whereas interpretative rules have
only the effect courts choose to give them.").
287
See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
288
See, e.g., Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415,
424-25 (1999) (deferring to the agency because of its expertise in the immigration
context).
289
See, e.g., Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000); see also Peter L.
Strauss, PublicationRules in the Rulemaking Spectrum: Assuring Proper Respect for an Essential

Element, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 803, 822-23 (2001) (explaining that the Supreme Court in
Skidmore and in Mead recognized that independent analysis of the language and intent of a
statute is the exclusive purview of the courts).
290
Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
291
Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 506 F.2d 33, 40 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
292
Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587 (quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140).
293
Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
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Where, as in this instance, an interpretation conflicts with a previous interpretive rule, some courts have opined that such interpretations deserve less deference than an interpretation consistently
espoused by an agency. 29 4 An agency's initial interpretation of a stat-

ute need not be "carved in stone, ' 295 and agencies "must be given
ample latitude to 'adapt their rules and policies to the demands of
changing circumstances.' "296 Nonetheless, consistency in an agency's
interpretation represents a significant marker for evaluating the legiti297
macy of subsequent changes in policy or practice.
2.

Unsettled Precedent: May Interpretive Rules Bind Future
Interpretation?

The Supreme Court in Shalala v. Guernsey Memorial Hospita 298
clearly stated that an interpretation that adopts a new position inconsistent with existing regulations triggers APA rulemaking requirements. 299 The Court's reasoning behind this argument suggests that

such an interpretation effectively amends or repeals the existing regulation.3 0 0 If one assumes that the Memorandum is a substantive rule,
as discussed in Part III, the Memorandum clearly triggers APA requirements and is procedurally invalid. Similarly, if one agrees that
the Memorandum presents a position that is inconsistent with the
plain meaning of § 3621, the Memorandum substantively lacks
merit.3 0 1 Courts have not, however, clearly articulated whether an
agency may amend or repeal an interpretive rule or policy statement
without running afoul of APA requirements, leaving open the question of whether an agency's prior interpretation can be so long-standing that it has legal effect and may be changed only through notice
and comment procedures. Courts thus have not conclusively offered
guidance to parties like the federal courts and the Bureau, who operated in reliance upon what appeared to be a settled interpretation.
Some courts and commentators have focused on the relatively
flexible nature of interpretive rules, noting that Congress intended
them to be administrative tools to explain, but not to supplement,
substantive regulations. 30 2 To this end, they have noted that Congress
294 See, e.g., Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 515 (1994).
295 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 863
(1984).
296 Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983)
(quoting In re Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 784 (1968)).
297 See Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120,
158-59
298
299
300
301
302

(2000).
514 U.S. 87 (1995).
See id. at 100.
See id.
See supra discussion Part [V.A.
See Anthony, supra note 2, at 13 & n.43.

20051

INTERPRETIVE RULES

exempted interpretive rules from the more cumbersome APA procedures, implicitly delegating to agencies the authority to interpret statutes where Congress has left a gap or ambiguity.30 3 On this theory,
agencies must have the flexibility to amend or repeal an initial interpretation of a gap or ambiguity, as well as to adapt to changed circumstances, so long as both interpretations are fairly encompassed within
the original regulation. 30 4 Some courts have upheld this view, suggesting that so long as the agency has not definitively spoken on an
informal policy, a new interpretive rule may overrule a long-standing
informal policy. 30 5 This position clearly recognizes the importance of
preserving interpretive rules as flexible administrative tools and suggests that even long-standing interpretations do not bear the force or
effect of law in court.
In contrast, other courts and commentators have recognized that
interpretive rules, guidance manuals, and policy statements have enormous consequences in agency regulation and, in practice, are often
regarded as binding. 30 6 The watershed administrative-law case Ver30 7
mont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council
first hinted that "a totally unjustified departure from well-settled
agency procedures of long standing might require judicial correction. '' 30 8

Complementing the Supreme Court's clear statement in

Shalala v. Guernsey Memorial Hospital,30 9 the D.C. Court of Appeals has
held, on several occasions, that an interpretation that differs significantly from a previous interpretation effectively amends the rule it-

303 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843
(1984); discussion supra Part III. But see Peter L. STRAUSS, TODD D. RAKOFF & C rNHIA R.
FARINA, GELLHORN AND BYSE'S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS

716 (rev. 10th

ed. 2003) (discussing concerns that agencies will purposely enact vague substantive rules,
and subsequently seek to fill in the gaps through interpretation, in order to avoid the
required notice and disclosure that the APA would generally demand).
304 See Robert A. Anthony & David A. Codevilla, Pro-Ossification:A HarderLook at Agency
Policy Statements, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 667, 678-79 (1996).
305
See Air Transp. Ass'n of Am. v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 291 F.3d 49, 57-58 (D.C. Cir.
2002) (finding that an interpretation did not trigger APA protections where it was not
inconsistent with the existing substantive regulation); Chief Prob. Officers v. Shalala, 118
F.3d 1327, 1334 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that the notice and comment requirement is
triggered when an interpretation conflicts with a prior rule, not merely a prior
interpretation).
306 See, e.g., Anthony & Codevilla, supra note 304, at 679 (commenting that those who
make adjudicatory decisions often apply policy statements in "the same routinely controlling way as they apply legislative rules").
307 435 U.S. 519, 525 (1978) (holding, ironically, that the APA represents the maximum procedural requirements that may be imposed upon agencies and that Congress and
agencies, rather than courts, should impose any extra procedural safeguards when
necessary).
308 Id. at 542.
309
514 U.S. 87, 100 (1995).
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self.3 10 Concerning the Memorandum in this instance, at least one

court similarly suggested that the DOJ's previous guidance manuals
and interpretations have some precedential value and questioned
whether long-standing interpretive rules should be wholly exempt
from APA procedures.3 11 Stating that "when an interpretation departs
from a long-standing agency practice, it too must be promulgated
under the general APA notice and comment procedures," the Howard
court acknowledged the unique nature of long-standing interpretations. 31 2 Similarly, the Iacabonicourt asserted that the rule in question
"represent[ed] a drastic departure from the [Bureau's] previous regulations and policies" 3 13 and concluded that the Bureau "must comply
with the strictures of the APA."'3 14 Even if long-standing interpretations do not trigger additional protections, since the APA itself does
not distinguish between initial and subsequent interpretations, an
agency must nonetheless publicly explain the reasoning behind its
new interpretation in order for a reviewing court to later deem it
315
reasonable.
In this instance, there is no doubt that federal courts and the
Bureau relied upon the long-standing practice and written statements
issued by the DOJ.3 16 As noted above, even after the DOJ had issued
the Memorandum, Kathleen Hawk Sawyer commented that the policy
of directly placing offenders in the community corrections component of CCCs was deeply rooted. 3 17 The ire and surprise of federal
310 See, e.g., Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 586 (D.C. Cir.
1997) (suggesting that "[o]nce an agency gives its regulation an interpretation, it can only
change that interpretation as it would formally modify the regulation itself: through the
process of notice and comment rulemaking"); Alaska Prof'l Hunters Ass'n v. Fed. Aviation
Admin., 177 F.3d 1030, 1033-34 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
311
See, e.g., Howard v. Ashcroft, 248 F. Supp. 2d 518, 536 (M.D. La. 2003) ("[W]hen an
interpretation departs from a long-standing agency practice, it too must be promulgated
under the general APA notice and comment procedures. There is no doubt that the new
Bureau 'policy' is the exact opposite from its past policy and practice with regard to direct
CCC commitments. Thus ... it is highly probable that the court could conclude that the
Bureau has issued a 'rule' that requires notice and comment.") (citation omitted).
312 Id. at 525, 536 (citing Shell Offshore Inc. v. Babbitt, 238 F.3d 622, 630 (5th Cir.
2001)).
313 See lacaboni v. United States, 251 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1040 (D. Mass. 2003).
314

Id.

315 See Scott H. Angstreich, Shoring Up Chevron: A Defense ofSeminole Rock Deference to
Agency Regulatory Interpretations,34 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 49, 79 (2000); supra Part III.A (noting
that courts regard interpretive rules with Skidmore deference, a relatively weak deference,
and evaluate these rules for their reasonableness).
816
The court in Alaska Professional Hunters suggested that written statements evidencing official advice concerning a policy are an important factor in considering the reasonableness of an interpretation as well as whether the interpretation is fairly encompassed
within the regulation. See Alaska Profl Hunters Ass'n v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 177 F.3d
1030, 1031-32 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (finding it significant that the Alaska Region never set
forth its interpretation in a written statement).
317 See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
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judges nationwide confirms this characterization. Although no single
document appears to specifically embrace the propriety of placing individuals directly in the community corrections component of CCCs, a
series of DOJ manuals and documents historically encouraged the
practice.3 18 Perhaps most notably, the DOJ asserted that the "Bureau
may designate an offender directly to a community based facility to
serve his or her sentence," noting that "ordinarily this is done only
with the concurrence of the sentencing court. '319 This guidance only
reaffirmed the Bureau and Commission's representations to Congress
in 1994, which posited that the "community corrections component
[was] designed to be sufficiently punitive to be a legitimate sanction. '320 Together, these and other documents consistently confirmed the availability and propriety of direct placement in the
community corrections component of CCCs, supporting the Bureau's
broad discretion to place offenders in CCCs and the courts' right to
recommend such placement.
The precedential value of the DOJ's publications and representations remains unclear, as does the answer to whether an interpretive
rule that replaces a long-standing interpretation triggers APA
rulemaking requirements.3 2 1 It is clear, however, that the pre-2002
DOJ documents directly contradict the Memorandum and inform
courts' inquiries as to the reasonableness of the DOJ's interpretation.
As such, these publications and representations retain their relevance,
not only in assessing the substantive merits of the agency's actions, but
also as part of a court's inquiry into the nature, consistency, and reasonableness of the DOJ's actions.
3.

The Memorandum's Faulty Statutory Analysis and Misapplication
of the Facts Fail to Harness the Power to Persuade

It is unlikely that a reviewing court would consider the Memorandum to be either reasonable or independently persuasive. As Parts III
and IV discuss, a court will likely find that the Memorandum misconstrued the plain terms of § 3621, straying outside of the language of
the statute and its legislative history to reinterpret punishment and
the proper role of CCCs. As such, a court will likely conclude that the
Memorandum is not reasonable where it does not comport with the
proper dictionary definitions of the terms "penal" and "correctional." 322 Similarly, a court will likely criticize the Memorandum's
318

See, e.g., JUDICIAL RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 93; Program Statement No. 7310.04,

supra note 13.
319
320

SeeJuDIcLAL RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 93, at 16.
REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 70, at 9-10; see supra notes 83-85 and accompany-

ing text.
321
See supra notes 298-315.
322
See supra text accompanying notes 224-28.
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consistent failure to treat the community corrections and prerelease
components of CCCs separately, finding this characterization to be at
odds with representations in Bureau manuals that the DOJ itself published. 323 Noting that the Memorandum did not originate out of a
particular agency expertise, a court will likely consider the statutory
and legislative history of 18 U.S.C. § 3621 and its predecessor to confirm the lack of ambiguity as to the breadth of authority Congress
intended to delegate to the Bureau.3 24 Moreover, acknowledging that
Congress and the Commission intended for the Guidelines to bind
only courts' discretion, a court will likely scrutinize the Memorandum's emphasis upon "harmonious interpretation,"'3 2 5 and be unconvinced by this apparent effort to "divest [the Bureau] of the discretion
''
that Congress has given it. 326
Taken together, these analyses do not undercut the DOJ's power
or authority to change or even reinterpret the breadth of the Bureau's
discretion and its treatment of CCC facilities. These analyses do, however, demonstrate that the DOJ selected the wrong administrative tool
to implement its vision. Many factors make the DOJ's efforts to characterize its policy as an interpretive rule suspect. The DOJ's answer as
to whether the Bureau may place certain offenders in CCCs is not selfevident, nor does it articulate a duty fairly encompassed within the
regulation. 327 To the contrary, numerous DOJ publications and representations previously articulated a policy directly contrary to that of
328
the Memorandum while purporting to interpret the same statute.
The DOJ is not precluded from reinterpreting its policy toward
placing prisoners directly in CCCs. In light of the aforementioned
factors, however, the DOJ must acknowledge that such a reinterpretation effectively amends the current rule or, at the very least, amends a
long-standing interpretation. 329 As such, the DOJ should implement
such a policy only by complying with notice and comment procedures
under the APA, a process through which the DOJ must answer its critics in a reasonable manner, subject to the court's review of its procedural efforts and its substantive answers. As it stands, it would not be
difficult for a court to deem the Memorandum unreasonable for any
of the many reasons discussed above.

323

See discussion supra Part I.C.2.

324

See discussion supra Part IV.A.
See Memorandum, supra note 17, at 6.
See lacaboni v. United States, 251 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1038 (D. Mass. 2003).
See supra note 161; discussion supra Part III.B.1.
See discussion supra Part I.C.2.
See discussion supra Part IV.C.2.

325
326
327
328
329
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CONCLUSION

The motivation behind the DOJ's Memorandum and revised
CCC policy remains unclear. The Memorandum deprived judges of
an important sentencing tool for difficult borderline cases, especially
those involving personal or economic hardship. 33 0 Prisoners who successfully petitioned the court received preliminary injunctions and
were permitted to remain in CCC facilities for the duration of their
sentences. 33 1 Those who were unsuccessful, and those who will face
sentencing in the future, no longer have the option of imprisonment
in the community corrections component of CCCs. 332 Although the

number of cases on this issue has diminished because of a decrease in
petitioners who have standing to challenge the rule, the impact of the
Memorandum persists, preventing judges from sentencing any lowlevel offenders directly to CCCs. 3 33 Fundamentally, the Memorandum

also deprived the federal government and taxpayers of an important
cost-saving tool; prisoner placement in CCCs freed taxpayers from the
cost of a minimum-security prison facility for select offenders and also
from funding welfare and other social benefits for prisoners' families,
because offenders continued to provide financially for their
334
families.
Despite the DOJ's efforts to characterize it otherwise, the Memorandum constitutes a substantive rule, one which admits of no exception, offers no meaningful opportunity for input, and severely restricts
the Bureau's power and discretion. 3 35 The Memorandum muddies
the interpretation of the plain language of 18 U.S.C. § 3621, disregarding the distinction between the community corrections and prerelease components of CCCs, and misinterprets the proper scope of
the Guidelines' authority. It is clear that the Guidelines do not restrict the Bureau's authority to place offenders in the community corrections component of CCCs and do not even mention this
component by name. Moreover, the Guidelines in no way purport to
undercut the broad authority granted to the Bureau in § 3621. On
these grounds, the DOJ Memorandum fails as either a substantive or
See supra text accompanying notes 9-15, 75-81.
331
See Iacaboni, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 1045; Byrd v. Moore, 252 F. Supp. 2d 293, 306
(W.D.N.C. 2003); Howard v. Ashcroft, 248 F. Supp. 2d 518, 547 (M.D. La. 2003).
332 The Bureau retains the power, however, to place inmates in such facilities for no
more than ten percent of their sentence in the prerelease component. See supra note 91
and accompanying text.
333 See, e.g., Judge Hellerstein, Crowley v. the Federal Bureau of Prisons: Bureau of Prisons is Wrong to Adopt Restrictive Policy on PlacingInmates in Halfway Houses, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 24,
2004, at 23; Tom Schoenberg, Halfway House Backlash: Low-Level Offenders Battle New DOJ
Policy Callingfor More Hard Time, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 10, 2003, at 1.
334
See supra note 13.
335 See Monahan v. Winn, 276 F. Supp. 2d 196, 215 (D. Mass. 2003) (commenting that
the DOJ was trying to "have its cake and eat it too").
330
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interpretive rule. Notwithstanding these arguments, the Bureau and
the DOJ do retain the power to reevaluate their policies regarding
CCCs and to disregard judicial recommendations. The guidelines of
the APA, however, do not permit the DOJ to simply reverse a longstanding policy and implement an administrative rule bearing the
force of law without ensuring adequate due process through notice
and comment procedures.

